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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Denition and Motivation
Credit derivatives are contracts which transfer credit risk of the underlying asset
between two parties. With credit derivatives, investors can trade and hedge the
credit risk. Compared with traditional debt market, investors no longer need to
buy and sell the bond in order to go long and short in the credit risk. Moreover,
investors can separate credit risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk of the
underlying names with credit derivatives, which also avoid further transaction
costs by reversing unnecessary positions. When some bonds are not available
for short selling, investors can go to credit derivative market and sell the credit
risk there. Hence, the investors can trade only credit risk and there is no or
limited up-front payment since the products in the credit derivative market are
usually unfunded.
The credit derivative market has evolved fast in both size and complexity. Ac-
cording to a recent survey by ISDA [2009], the notional amount of the credit
derivatives has increased to around $38.6 trillion at the end of year 2008. The
development of the credit derivative market is substantial, when the fact that
the notional amount was virtually nil in the 1990s is taken into account.
Another advantage of credit derivatives is from their o-balance sheet nature.
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They are usually on the trading book, rather than on the balance sheet, and are
more favorable than the usual debt instruments due to the capital requirements.
Market regulators have focused on the possible crisis in the fast-growing credit
derivative market. On 27 September 2006, the Fed, SEC and FSA issued a
joint statement on Financial Times with the title 'A safer strategy for the credit
products explosion'. They pointed out that the credit derivative market has
developed enormously and the market faced formidable challenges in measuring
and managing nancial risks. They foresaw a possible crisis and warned:
'Often it takes a crisis to generate the will and energy needed to solve a problem.
Here, the industry deserves credit for acting in advance of a crisis.'
The most popular products in the credit derivative market by notional amount
outstanding, are single-name credit default swap (CDS), indices and portfolio
products, respectively. The single-name CDS is a contract between credit risk
protection buyer and seller. The protection buyer transfers the CDS premium,
usually on a quarterly basis, to the protection seller and receives the compen-
sation if the credit event is triggered. According to the ISDA documentation,
the credit event can be bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, obligation default,
failure to pay, repudiation and moratorium, and restructuring failure to pay.
When there is a credit event, the CDS contract is terminated immediately and
the protection buyer will be compensated for the losses. There are two dierent
types of settlement. When the cash settlement is chosen, the protection seller
pays the dierence between par value and nal value of the underlying obliga-
tion. Contrarily, the protection seller buys the distressed bond at par from the
protection buyer. Since the only requirement for bonds is pari passu, the pro-
tection buyer is implicitly granted a cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option to give
away the cheapest bond among the deliverable obligations1. Nowadays, most of
1The CTD option is only relevant when physical settlement is chosen. Under cash set-
tlement, dierent deliverable obligations have the same seniority. The compensation is the
dierence between par value and recovered value of the obligations. The recovery rates of
dierent deliverable obligations are identical because of identical seniority. Hence, the com-
pensation is unique in the cash settlement, regardless of the dierent prices of the deliverable
obligations.
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the CDS contracts choose physical settlement2.
According to the ISDA market survey, single-name CDS counts for around 50%
of the notional amount outstanding of all credit derivatives and is also used in
credit derivatives, such as synthetic CDOs and CDS indices. It is followed by
the indices and the portfolio products. These three products count for more
than 90% of all outstanding notional amount. It is worthwhile noticing that the
indices, which include both CDX indices and iTraxx indices, have an enormous
growth since its inception in 2004. Previously, there were several dierent in-
dices traded in the market, which were not standardized and had low liquidity.
The new indices are based on the most traded names in North America and
Europe, and are rebalanced regularly to maintain the liquidity requirement.
With the approval of the regulators, CBOT and CME have started the trad-
ing of the futures on these indices, which add further liquidity to index products.
Credit derivatives have provided investors with more liquidity and alternative
ways to trade credit risk. With its specic features, the credit derivative market
has become an important market for both proprietary trading desks and hedge
funds.
1.2 Research Questions
Credit risk of the same name is priced in both bond and credit derivative mar-
kets. When prices in the two markets dier substantially from each other,
following questions are of our interest:
Is it protable to buy the credit risk in one market and sell it in the
other?
There are various factors which aect the prot of these trading strategies. First,
transaction costs in both markets play important roles. Bid-ask spreads of the
2Usually, the cash settlement occurs within ve days after the credit event.
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CDS premium are charged by dealers for their own prots. When the bid-ask
spread is wide, the investor may face signicant transaction cost. Even if the
mid price for credit risk in the two market converges, considerable transaction
costs can still drive the arbitrage prot deep under the water. Secondly, if the
investor buys the bond in debt market, he has to nance the dirty price of the
bond in overnight market. The cost of carry will be taken into account when he
calculates the prot. Thirdly, the investor might not be able to hold his position
for a considerable period of time. Due to in-house regulatory reasons, he might
be forced to close his position before two prices for credit risk actually converge.
For a better understanding of dierent prices of credit risk, the determinants
of the basis, which is dened as CDS premium minus credit spread, are closely
studied. To forecast the level of the basis, investors need to identify the drivers
of the basis. The movement of these state variables will determine the level of
the basis, which is of vital importance for the decision on whether to buy and
sell the credit risk. This leads to the second research question.
Which factors drive the basis?
Aunon-Nerin et al. [2002] have studied the inuence of fundamental variables
on the CDS premium. They nd that a signicant portion of the cross-sectional
variation can be explained by fundamental factors. The determinants of the
credit spread are documented by Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001]. They argue that
corporate bond market is a segmented market, and there exist specic supply
and demand shocks. We investigate the net eect of CDS premia and bond
spread determinants on the level of basis.
After we study the basis for single-name CDS premia and the credit spread, the
relationship between the investment with the indices of CDS and bonds is under
investigation. This dierence can be considered to have systematic credit risk
only, contrasts to the basis for a single name.
Which factors drive the systematic credit risk, are they priced ac-
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cordingly in credit derivative and bond markets?
The investors can buy and sell the systematic credit risk in both credit derivative
and bond markets. In credit derivative market, they trade systematic compo-
nent of credit risk by entering into a CDS index contract. In bond market, they
are, at least in principle, able to replicate the bond index by a tracking portfolio
of bonds3. If two markets price the systematic credit risk accordingly, there ex-
ists a stable relationship between indices of credit derivatives and bonds. Given
the increasing trading volume of credit derivative indices, it is essential for in-
vestors to understand this relationship to improve the trading of the systematic
credit risk.
1.3 Outline
The three research questions we consider focus on the relationship between
credit risks, either single-name or systematic, and whether credit derivative and
bond markets are disconnected.
In Chapter 2, for the rst time in the literature the results of possible arbitrage
trading with single-name CDS premia and bond-specic asset swaps are inves-
tigated. A cash-ow based arbitrage study is conducted to check whether it is
protable to buy CDS, buy bond and enter asset swap contract as xed rate
payer or vice versa. We take into account of institutional facts and transaction
costs as both have an important impact on the result of an arbitrage strategy.
Usually, it is more dicult to short a bond than to long a bond. Therefore,
we separate the cases when the basis is positive or negative. Dierent opening
cushions, holding period limits, and closing cushions are chosen in the analy-
sis to determine the optimal strategies of the basis trading. In an in-sample
analysis, we nd that rst, the ratings and industrial sectors aect mean prot
per trade. Secondly, the mean prot per trade declines as the market has ma-
tured. Thirdly, the mean prot per trade of negative basis trade is higher than
3Usually, the bond index is not traded in the exchange. Hence, investors have to form their
own bond portfolio.
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that of positive basis trade. Fourthly, applying the position limit signicantly
raise mean prot per trade. These ndings have important implications for the
market participants when the disconnection between the CDS and asset swap
spread exists.
Chapter 3 checks possible determinants of the basis. The basis depends on the
factors that aect CDS premium and credit spread. These factors may interact
with each other such that the net eect is still not clear. Using the xed eect
model, we nd that individual equity return has no impact on the basis, but
implied volatility, long- term interest rate and slope of the interest rate curve
still signicantly aect the basis. Liquidity proxy of credit derivative market
behaves dierently in two sub-samples. Our ndings enables investors to iden-
tify whether the level of the basis is justied by state variables, or whether it
gives a signal to exploit it by arbitrage trading.
Chapter 4 discusses the relationship of prices of systematic credit risks in CDS
and bond markets. Using the data of the iTraxx Europe index and the iBoxx
Corporate index to form two portfolios, we compare the performance of these
two indices4. To investigate the relationship, we use a multiple time series anal-
ysis for returns of these two portfolios. The vector error correction model shows
that the cointegrating relation drives the change of credit derivative and bond
markets. We also nd positive autocorrelation in the changes of credit deriva-
tive market and negative autocorrelations in the changes of bond market. The
research on the relationship of systematic credit risks between credit derivative
and bond markets is the rst empirical work in this eld.
4Directly comparison is dicult. The iTraxx index is unfunded and there is only limited
up-front payment.
Chapter 2
Arbitrage between CDS
and Bond Markets
2.1 Introduction
Credit risk is priced in both bond and credit derivative markets. The asset
swap spread for a bond is directly comparable to the credit default swap (CDS)
premium of the same name in the credit derivative market. Financial theory in-
dicates that these two premia should be identical, otherwise the investor prots
by taking long and short positions and holding this position until the premia
converge. Nevertheless, such a relationship might not hold in actual markets
because the investor pays the round-trip transaction costs of the CDS premium
and asset swap spread to the dealers. If the discrepancy between the CDS pre-
mium and asset swap spreads is not large, the cash ow from the transactions
would not be sucient to cover the trading cost. Moreover, in our arbitrage
version, the investor has to short sell the bond as counter-repo and some bonds
are dicult to short sell, so an arbitrage prot becomes less likely.
The arbitrage from trading the basis, dened as the CDS premium minus the
asset swap spread, is not the usual textbook arbitrage. Instead, the investor
might make a loss if the spreads diverge rather than converge. Even if the ba-
sis does not change, the investor makes losses as he has to pay the nancing cost.
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We investigate whether CDS premia and asset swap spreads allow for protable
arbitrage strategies. The results show that the mean prots per trade from
appropriate trading strategies are positive. We nd that the optimal trading
strategy is to enter the market when there is large discrepancy between CDS
premium and asset swap spreads and to close the position when the basis is
substantially tight: it pays o to be patient. We also nd that strategies with
longer holding periods outperform their counterparties in most cases and that
the performance of negative basis trading beats that of positive basis trading.
The results have important implications for the strategies of arbitrageurs in
these markets.
Our research answers the question of whether it is protable to trade the basis,
and then identies the optimal strategy. This is the rst paper on arbitrage in
this area. There exist an increasing number of studies on CDS premia, credit
spreads and their relationships, and to put our paper into perspective we briey
discuss the relationship of our paper to these studies.
The determinants of CDS and those of the credit spread have been examined by
Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001], Elton et al. [2001], Aunon-Nerin et al. [2002], who
nd similar factors behind changes in the CDS premium and the credit spread.
Since the credit derivative and cash bond have the same underlying, the credit
risk should be comparable. Longsta et al. [2005] extend this by checking the
default and nondefault components of credit spreads using the CDS informa-
tion and nd that liquidity has a strong impact on the non-default components.
Using European data, Cossin and Lu [2005] also report that the disconnection
between the credit derivative and cash bond markets is due to the price of liq-
uidity in the cash bond.
The determinants of basis have been investigated as well. Schueler [2001] shows
possibilities of basis trading and suggests various methods to calculate the asset
swap spread. Buehler et al [2005] nd that the volatility of the underlying entity
has a strong impact on the basis. The information ow in CDS and bond mar-
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kets is also discussed. The relationship between the CDS premium and credit
spread is addressed and conrmed by Blanco et al. [2005]. Norden and Weber
[2004] check the lead-lag relationships between equity, CDS premia and bond
markets. Hull et al. [2004] consider the relationship between CDS premia, bond
yields, and credit rating announcements.
Crouch and Marsh [2005] address the theoretical arbitrage relationship between
CDS and asset swap spreads. Using data from the automotive sector, they nd
that the arbitrage relationship equating CDS premium and asset swap spread
holds at low levels of credit risk but not at high levels because of the dierence
in liquidity and cheapest-to-deliver options. Our study sets the entrance trigger
based on the level of the basis and the perceived credit risk of the underlying,
for which the mid CDS premium is a proxy, the holding period limit for the po-
sition, and the exit trigger to calculate the prot of dierent trading strategies.
The arbitrage discussed here diers from the typical arbitrage in stock market
index futures for the following reasons. The basis does not converge to zero
as the dierent supply and demand in cash and credit derivative markets and
unwinding the position could happen when a margin call forces liquidation.
When the CDS premium is lower than the asset swap spread, some investors
expect the long-term relationship to pull them closer to each other. If the CDS
premium increases thereafter, given no change in the asset swap spread, the
mark-to-market valuation of the CDS will lead to a prot. Even if one of the
two spreads moves against the investor's position, he might still earn the prot
when the net eect is in his favour. Nevertheless, he might be forced into in-
terim liquidation when a certain holding time period limit is met. Furthermore,
if the dierence between the CDS premium and asset swap spreads widens much
during the holding period, the investor might get a margin call for his collateral
with the dealer and has to unwind his order immediately. A similar risk-return
trade-o is analyzed in Duarte et al. [2005].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the
credit derivative and bond markets. Section 2 presents the trading strategies
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and criteria for building and unwinding the position. Section 3 reports the data
we use. Section 4 provides the results and analyzes the implications. Section 5
concludes.
2.2 CDS Premia and Asset Swap Spreads
2.2.1 Credit Default and Asset Swaps
A single-name credit default swap is a contract between the credit protection
buyer and seller, which has a xed leg and a oating leg as a plain-vanilla in-
terest rate swap. The xed leg consists of the quarterly xed payments which
the protection buyer transfers to the protection seller. The oating leg results
in a transaction between the two counterparties if a credit event occurs as de-
scribed in the contract. If the cash settlement is chosen, the protection seller
transfers an amount of money, which equals the face value not recovered in the
credit event, to the protection buyer. In the case of physical settlement, the
protection seller pays the notional amount of the debt to the protection buyer
while the protection buyer delivers the bond from the predetermined basket of
deliverable bonds to the protection seller. The CDS contract ends immediately
when the credit event triggers. According to the ISDA Agreement, the main
triggers of credit events are default, bankruptcy, failure to pay or restructuring
of the reference entity.
The CDS market has grown rapidly. According to recent survey data of ISDA
[2009], single-name CDS has a volume of $38.6 trillion outstanding contracts at
the end of 2008.
In our study we also use asset swaps. An asset swap is a contract in which the
counterparties agree to exchange xed future payments against variable future
payments. Typically, an asset swap is used to translate the price risk of a xed
coupon bond into a variable coupon risk. The oating asset swap payment is
calculated by using the notional amount and asset swap rate, which is composed
of a benchmark rate (usually Libor or Euribor) and an asset swap spread. The
2.2. CDS PREMIA AND ASSET SWAP SPREADS 11
buyer of an asset swap makes xed payments and receives variable payments,
and vice versa for the seller.
There is a dierence between an asset swap and a plain vanilla interest rate
swap. In a fair priced plain vanilla interest rate swap, there is no upfront money
exchange. In an asset swap, however, the asset swap buyer, who makes xed
and receives oating payments, needs to pay the seller the amount of accrued
interest from the asset swap oating leg minus the accrued interest from the
bond and the dierence between the par value and the bond clean price in the
par-in-par-out scheme if this dierence is positive. Otherwise he receives the
net payment.
The payment structure also diers. In the plain vanilla interest rate swap as
traded in the US market, the payment dates are every 180-days in the future.
In an asset swap, both the xed and variable payments are made at the coupon
dates of the bond swapped from xed to variable payments.
An asset swap contract does not necessarily include buying the bond; it is merely
a contract for exchanging the xed and oating payments. However, it is always
used for pricing a xed-coupon bond. The bonds are quoted with their asset
swap spread and traded based on such information. Insofar this means that a
bond is also included in the asset swap contract.
Usually the xed leg payer of an asset swap also buys a bond. After he pur-
chases the bond at the dirty price, he pays the dierence between this dirty
price and par, and pays the accrued interest from the oating leg of the asset
swap to the counterparty to enter the asset swap contract, if the dirty price is
higher than the sum of the par value and the accrued interest from the oating
leg. Otherwise he receives the dierence between the dirty price and the par
value, plus the accrued interest from the oating leg. When the asset swap is
unwound, the asset swap buyer transfers the dierence of the sum of the par
value and the accrued interest from the oating leg and the dirty price of the
bond to the asset swap seller if the dierence is positive. Otherwise he receives
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the dierence between the par value and the clean price5.
Table 2.1 presents the cash ows of buying CDS protection, longing the bond
and entering an asset swap with and without default. These cash ow represen-
tations are the basis of our study.
The cash ow of an asset swap buyer at the settlement date of an asset swap is:
CF0 = Payment from the Seller   Payment to the Seller
= PC0 +AI0(Bond)   FV  AI0(Swap);
(2.1)
where PC0 is the clean price of the bond, AI0(Bond) is the accrued interest
of the bond, FV is the face value of the bond and AI0(Swap) is the accrued
interest of the oating leg of the asset swap. The accrued interest payments are
determined for the period from the bond's last coupon date to the settlement
date of the bond and the asset swap, respectively.
5Usually, a bond is traded at par when it is redeemed. This is the so called "pull-to-par"
eect. Hence, no exchange of payments will be made.
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2.3 Arbitrage Strategies
2.3.1 Negative Basis Trading Strategy
When the CDS premium is lower than the asset swap spread, we observe a
negative basis. The total amount of investment when implementing a negative
basis trading strategy, as we have shown above, is equal to the par value plus
the accrued interest of the asset swap oating leg. Since the CDS contract is
unfunded, there is no upfront cost for purchasing the protection. We assume
that an investor will nance his investment on a daily basis in the overnight
market, and that he rolls over his loan.
We suppose that the investor enters one standard CDS contract as protection
buyer and buys one piece of cash bond. This approach with normalized notional
amount fully captures the relationship between CDS and bond. One can easily
raise the amount of CDS contract and bond. However, as our aim is to investi-
gate the relationship between CDS and bond, we normalize the amount of CDS
contract and cash bond without loss of generality.
We assume that the investor can trade at the price when the trading signal ap-
pears. This assumption is fair as brokers always put a certain expiration period
for each quoted price, and the investor can trade at the quote in this respective
time period.
The strategy consists of the following transactions. The investor purchases CDS
in the credit derivatives market and the bond in the bond market. He subse-
quently enters the asset swap contract. Using a par asset swap contract, he
matches the face value of the asset swap with that of the CDS.
If the exit trigger is met at time 1, which is assumed to be before the next
coupon date, the investor unwinds his position. His cash inow consists of four
components: (1) unwinding the CDS contract; (2) closing out the asset swap;
(3) selling the bond; and (4) repayment of the overnight loan.
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If the CDS contract is unwound, two components have to be taken into ac-
count: the market value of the contract at the unwinding date which equals
iCDS(CDS1   CDS0) and the accrued interest of the CDS contract CDS0 
t=360. The present value of the payment from the CDS premium change
is calculated with a risk-adjusted discount factor iCDS = 1=(Swapi + CDS1)
where Swapi is the swap rate with i year tenor. Because the cash ow could
stop in the future if there is a credit event that voids the CDS contract, we add
the CDS premium on the unwinding date to the 5-year interest swap rate to
discount the risky cash ows.
The accrued interest of the CDS is the payment made by the investor for being
protected against the credit event during the holding period.
Therefore, the net cash ow of the CDS part is the current market value of the
CDS premium change minus the accrued interest or the pro-rata payment of
the CDS premium. The sum is i(CDS1   CDS0)  CDS0  t365 .
In the asset swap part, the investor's P&L when he unwinds the position is com-
posed of par value plus the accrued interest of the asset swap oating leg, the
payment due to the change in Libor rates and the payment due to the change in
asset swap spreads. The accrued interest of the asset swap is calculated in the
same way as the investor builds his position at time 0, which equals ASS0  t365 .
The payment due to the change in Libor rates is the net present value of the
change of Libor in the next payment date:
1(Libor0   Libor1)  t
360
(2.2)
where Libor0 and Libor1 are the Libor rates when positions are built and un-
wound, respectively, 1 is the risk-less discount factor of period 1, t is the
time period between the dates when the investor builds and unwinds the posi-
tion with a day count convention of actual/3606.
6The Libor0 and Libor1 usually have irregular tenors, i.e. the period between the day
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The payment due to the change in asset swap spreads is calculated in a similar
way to the CDS, which equals iASW (ASW0   ASW1). However, an investor
uses the zero curve bootstrapped from the current swap curve as risk-less dis-
count factor to calculate the net present value instead of using risky discount
factor. The discount factor iASW = 1=Swapi, where Swapi is the bootstrapped
swap rate with i year tenor. The rationale behind this is that the only risk in
asset swap contract is interest rate risk; the default risk of the bond issuers does
not matter. Following the arguments of Due and Huang [1996] and Duarte
et al. [2005] that counterparty risk is minimal because of the fully collateralized
swap, we neglect it.
The payment schedules of asset swap rates and CDS premia are also dierent.
Asset swap spreads are supposed to be paid with the same payment schedule
as the bond, while payment schedule of the CDS has quarterly frequency and
starts when the default swap contract is written.
When the investor closes the position, he sells the bond at its dirty price P1.
Meanwhile, he has to pay back the overnight loan when he unwinds the position.
This payment is the amount borrowed plus the compound interest. As we have
discussed, the amount borrowed equals the sum of face value and accrued inter-
est of the asset swap when the investor opens his position, i.e. FV +ASW0 t 1360
where t 1 denotes the time period between the date when the position is
opened and the last coupon date.
Putting these parts together, prot of negative basis trading strategy can be
worked out. To sum it up, if the basis meets the trigger, the investor will im-
mediately unwind his position; if not, he will hold the position and roll it over
to the next day. When the maximum holding period is met, he will unwind his
position regardless of the prot.
when the position is built and unwound, and the next coupon day of the bond, respectively.
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2.3.2 Positive Basis Trading Strategy
The investor needs to reverse his position in the negative basis trading strategy
when positive basis is wide enough, i.e. the entrance trigger is met. He builds
his position by selling CDS as credit protection, short selling the cash bond
and entering the asset swap as xed payment receiver. He invests income from
short selling the bond and the upfront payment of accrued interest from the
associated asset swap in the overnight market.
The positive basis trading strategy is harder to implement than its negative
counterpart. First, it is hard to borrow the cash bond and then to short sell it,
particularly as some illiquid bonds are extremely dicult to obtain. Secondly,
even if the investor successfully borrows the cash bond, there are potential hair-
cut costs and possibly a margin deposit with the dealer. During the holding
period, if the investor cannot satisfy the possible margin call requirement, he
may be forced into interim liquidation.
We ignore the inuence of haircut costs and a margin deposit requirement in
our paper as it depends on the creditworthiness of individual investors. When
the investor unwinds his position, he eectively terminates the CDS with the
credit protection buyer, unwinds the asset swap at its market value, purchases
the cash bond at its dirty price with money invested in the overnight market
and sends the bond back to the lender. Prot in the positive trading strategy
involves the same components as the negative basis trading strategy.
The rst part is the net present value of the cash ow from the dierence in CDS
premia using risky discount curve and the payment of accrued interest from the
CDS. The second part is from the asset swap contract, which is composed of the
market value of the cash ow from the dierence in asset swap spreads using the
risk-less discount curve, the net present value of the change in the Libor rates
and the cash outow of accrued interest of asset swap oating leg. The third
part is the dirty price the investor pays to buy back the bond and the fourth
part is the interest income from the overnight market. The calculation of the
prot uses the same steps as that of the negative basis trading strategy with
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reversed sign.
2.3.3 Setup
We assume that there is an investor who can simultaneously trade both bonds
and CDS. He has no initial capital but is able to nance the investment by bor-
rowing in the overnight market. He could also short sell the bond by borrowing
from the broker. He may have position limits for both borrowing activities.
The credit derivative market is not frictionless as the investor has transaction
costs in buying and selling a CDS. Although the bond market is not frictionless
either, we do not model the round-trip trading cost as the data are not available.
We dene the basis as the dierence between CDS premium and asset swap
spread. A positive basis suggests, at least theoretically, that protection buying
is relatively expensive. In this case, the investor possibly opens an arbitrage
position by selling credit protection in the CDS market and selling the bond.
A negative basis shows that buying protection is relatively cheap; the investor
opens an arbitrage position by buying credit protection and buying the cash
bond.
When the basis is suciently large relative to the mid CDS premium, and the
investor expects it to tighten in the near future, he opens his position. When
the basis is negative and wide, the investor will buy the CDS protection at the
ask quote and enter the asset swap contract to receive the oating rate payment
and pay the xed rate payment. When the basis is positive, the investor will
reverse this strategy.
Opening cushion
Independently of the type of arbitrage strategies we consider, the position would
be opened when entrance trigger is met. There are many ways to determine this
trigger. The traders usually have reasonable basis levels for individual bonds
in mind. When the basis level is higher than what they consider is reasonable,
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trade orders will be placed.
In our study, we assume that the investor builds the position when a certain
opening cushion is met. The opening cushion is dened as the absolute value
of the basis, minus the estimated transaction cost (bid-ask spread of the CDS
premium) over mid CDS premium. When the opening cushion exceeds the
predetermined threshold, the position will be established. We use the relative
basis rather than the absolute basis as a threshold. A basis of 10 bps might be
considered tight for an entity with mid CDS of 200 bps, but not for another
entity with mid CDS of 50 bps. The bid-ask spread of the CDS premium is
also taken into account. Since the investor buys the CDS at the ask price and
sells at the bid price, it is of vital importance for him to consider the trading cost.
If the opening cushion is high, in order for a position to be opened, the basis
must obviously to be high as well, i.e. if the mispricing is large and likely to
disappear shortly. Therefore, we believe that the mean prot per trade increases
as the opening cushion rises.
[Hypothesis 1: Opening Cushion] H0: The mean prot per trade increases
monotonically with the opening cushion.
We consider only names that are rated Baa or better at the current date. How-
ever, we exclude all Baa names which have mid CDS premia higher than average
mid CDS premia of Baa names in the past 90 trading days. The rationale be-
hind this is that we assume the CDS premium is a more accurate indicator of
the underlying credit quality than the rating from rating agencies.
Holding Period
As basis trading opens a short position either in the bond market in the case
of a positive basis trading or in the money market in the case of negative basis
trading, the investor may have a holding period limit, which restricts him from
taking excessive leverage. In our design, we use and compare several exogenous
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holding period limits.
When the holding period limit applies, we assume that the investor can hold
the short position in the bond or money market for a certain period. When the
holding-period limit is met, he has to close the position regardless of whether
the trade generates a prot or loss. The investor with a looser holding period
limit, i.e. longer period, is likely to heap a higher mean prot at a higher risk.
Hypothesis 2 is formulated:
[Hypothesis 2: Holding Period Limit] H0: The mean prot increases when
the holding period limit rises7.
Every coin has two sides. It is argued that the longer the holding period limit
the more likely an investor is to close the position too late. The argument is
based on the fact that the basis will be more likely to diverge or maintain the
status quo than to converge. However, we would expect that the basis will con-
verge as both the CDS and bonds have comparable credit risk.
As the holding period increases, the prots can be expected to vary. If the
basis does not converge, the arbitrage prot will be even worse because of the
nancing cost. Hypothesis 3 is formulated:
[Hypothesis 3: Standard deviation of prot per trade] H0: The stan-
dard deviation of prot per trade increases when the holding period limit rises.
Closing Cushion
The investor realizes the prot or loss by closing the position. There are two
possibilities for doing this: when the holding period limit is met, the posi-
tion must be closed; or when the closing cushion is hit, the investor closes
the position as he thinks the basis is now 'reasonable'. We assume this is
the case when the current value of the basis is less than the absolute value of
7When holding period limit rises, the investor can hold the position longer.
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the basis when the position is built multiplied by the closing cushion, i.e. if
jbasisunwindj < jbasisbuildj  Cushion, holds.
Market convention uses the targeted spread level instead of monetized amount
of prot for basis trade. This approach is widely accepted due to the fact that
tightened basis is related to the absolute level of CDS premium. Moreover, the
measure in basis point will not mislead investors who have dierent notional
amount of basis trades.
A higher closing cushion will result in lower mean prot per trade, provided the
positions are closed voluntarily. On the other hand, higher cushions will cause
more voluntarily closed positions, so the consequence of an increased cushion is
not obvious. We believe that the rst eect dominates.
[Hypothesis 4: Closing Cushion] H0: The mean prot per trade increases
when the closing cushion is lower.
Rating Class
In our data set, we nd the basis smile phenomenon, i.e. the basis of names
which belong to the best and to the worst rating classes, are higher than the
basis for medium-rated names. The observation can be explained as follows: for
highly rated rms the CDS premia are positive where the asset swap spread is
close to zero or even negative, i.e. the credit quality of these names are higher
than that of the Libor (usually Aa rating). The basis for the low rating class is
high as the credit derivative market is thin and, in the case of nancial turmoil,
an investor might tend to buy the CDS protection at an unreasonable price just
to protect against his credit exposure.
[Hypothesis 5: Rating] H0: The mean prots of dierent rating classes are
signicantly dierent.
Maturation of the Market
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The CDS market has grown rapidly in recent years. According to the ISDA
survey report, the number of underlying entities, total notional amount and
the number of market participants have increased sharply. As the market ma-
tures, arbitrage possibilities are expected to decline and mean prots to drop.
If credit derivative and cash bond markets value the credit risk dierently, in-
vestors will immediately notice the discrepancy and execute the trades. Hence,
the mis-pricing in the two markets is eliminated quickly and fewer positions will
be opened.
[Hypothesis 6: Maturation] H0: The prot per trade of basis trading de-
creases over time.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data Description
The CDS bid and ask quotes from January 2001 through April 2006 are ob-
tained from CreditTrade. Each record contains the created date, the name and
the CreditTrade issuer identication of the underlying entity, the bid and ask
quotes, the S&P and the Moody's ratings, the restructuring type, the denom-
inated currency, the tenor, the notional amount, the industry, the credit type,
the country, and the region. Because 5-year CDS is the most liquid product in
the market, we choose the tenor of ve years and a notional amount of either
5m or 10m.
To make the CDS premium and asset swap spread comparable, we selected se-
nior unsecured and straight bonds for our sample, and retrieved the asset swap
data for these bonds from Bloomberg service. If there is more than one bond
available, we choose the one with a maturity date closest to ve years. Figure
2.1 presents the mid CDS and asset swap spread of an individual entity.
We use bid and ask quotes of CDS to capture the transaction costs of basis
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trade. Mid asset swap spread in our research as no bid and ask quotes for asset
swap spread are available.
If CDS premium and asset swap spread do not converge or even diverge, the
investor has the risk that loss may occur. This risk cannot be completely ruled
out, but we can reduce the risk by trading bases which are suciently wide.
In this case, the investor makes prot if CDS premium and asset swap spread
partially converge.
There are two possible candidates for the risk-less rate in calculating the risk-less
discount curve: government-bond rate and swap rate. As asset swap spread is
added to Libor at, which is the variable reference rate for plain vanilla interest
rate swaps, we use, as practitioners do, the swap rate as the "risk-free" rate.
If the CDS and asset swap are denominated in euro, we choose the euro-swap
rate; if they are denominated in dollars, we use the dollar-swap rate.
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Figure 2.1: Mid CDS and Asset Swap Spread
The dashed line and the solid line show the mid CDS and asset swap spread in
bps, respectively. The underlying bond is with C 6.625% 11/15/06 which has
ISIN US201615DL29.
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The bid and ask quotes from CreditTrade, an internet-based broker of credit
products, are essential in identifying whether the strategies are protable or
not. The asset swap spreads of the respective bonds and the swap rates are
from Bloomberg service. Outlier in the database are excluded.8
2.4.2 Sample Statistics
Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the bid and ask quotes of CDS and
the asset swap spread by rating class.
The mean value of the mid CDS premium increases with deteriorating ratings.
However, due to the rigidity of the rating migration and the unbalanced nature
of the data set, the order of the absolute numeric value of the mid CDS premium
can vary when the number of observations is not suciently large. For example,
we nd that the mean value of the Aa3 rating class is higher than that of the
Aa2 rating class. Given that the number of observations for the Aa3 rating class
is just 667, around 25% of that of the Aa2 rating class and 50% of that of the
Aaa rating class, the mean value can be signicantly aected by one or more
names. There are three reference entities with an Aa3 rating, namely Citigroup,
NTT DoCoMo and Toyota Motor. The mean value is driven by the high level
of Citigroup's mid CDS premium, which has a mean value of 44bps. As most of
the mid CDS data are from before 2003, the period when the CDS premium was
at its peak, Citigroup's high mean value comes from the unbalanced nature of
the data. For a particular rating class, the standard deviation of the mid CDS
premium is high when the dates of the observations vary widely. In the table,
we observe that the standard deviation of the A3 rating class is comparatively
higher than the others. Since the CDS market developed rapidly, the evolving
nature of the mid CDS premium strongly aects the standard deviation. In the
last columns, we show the maximum and the minimum values of the mid CDS
premium.
We also show the descriptive statistics of the asset swap spread. Compared
8See Appendix for details.
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with that of the mid CDS premium, the mean value of the asset swap spread
does not increase monotonically with deteriorating credit quality. We observe
that the mean value of the Aaa rating class is below zero, which conrms that
the credit quality of Aaa is higher than that of the US$ Libor or Euribor. The
standard deviation of the asset swap spread is lower than that of the mid CDS
premium for rating classes lower than Aa1.
The maximum and minimum values of the asset swap spreads are shown in the
next columns. We nd that the maximum values of asset swap spreads. with
the exception of Aa3, are lower than those of the mid CDS premium for most
of the rating classes. Negative values are found in the reported minimum values
for more than half of the rating classes.
The bid-ask spreads are also included in the descriptive statistics because we
are interested in the development and trade ow of the credit derivative market,
which can be partly inferred from the bid-ask spreads. Tight bid-ask spreads
usually suggest that the liquidity in the market is adequate and two-way ows
are occurring. On the other hand, wide bid-ask spreads implicitly show that
there is less liquidity in the market and some of the quotes may be only be
indicative.
The level of the bid-ask spreads is closely related to the mean value of the mid
CDS premium; it goes up as the mean value of the mid CDS premium increases.
We see that most observations are in the space between the A3 to Baa1 rating
classes. According to Fitch Rating's survey, the average quality of the traded
CDS names are Baa-equivalent rating classes9. The standard deviations of the
bid-ask spread increases substantially when the credit quality falls below invest-
ment grade. The next columns report the maximum and minimum values of the
bid-ask spreads. We nd that certain rating classes have much higher maximum
values, which can be traced back to the reference entity both Enron and Brazil.
9The original rating classes quoted are in the S&P domain. Here we mirror the level of the
S&P rating to that of the Moody's rating.
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Table 2.4: Decomposition of Underlying Entities
The table reports the composition of the database by currency, industry sector, domiciled
country and continent, respectively. Only investment grade names are included.
Panel A
US Dollar 56%
Euro 44%
Panel B
Telco, Utility 22%
Financial 21%
Consumer goods 15%
Sovereign 11%
Automobile 4%
Other corporates 27%
Panel C
US 37%
France 12%
Netherlands 11%
UK 11%
Germany 6%
Panel D
Europe 50%
North America 37%
Asia/Non-Japan 7%
Others 6%
Next we divide the sample into two sub-samples based on the sign of the basis.
Panel A of Table 2.3 reports the descriptive statistics of positive basis, while
Panel B shows that of negative basis. When the rating is better than A2, the
levels of CDS premia of positive basis and negative basis are similar but the as-
set swap spreads are lower in the case of a positive basis than for a negative basis.
As the rating deteriorates to lower than A2, the CDS premia of positive basis
rise substantially while the dierence between the asset swap spreads are less
signicant.
Table 2.4 presents a breakdown of the underlying entities in our study. In Panel
A, we see that among the 32,851 pairs of CDS premia and asset swap spreads
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data, 56% are denominated in US dollars and 44% are denominated in euro.
The underlying entities denominated in US dollars are composed of the US
corporate, foreign corporate and sovereign entities. Panel B presents the break-
down for the top industries. The Telco and Utility sector counts for 22% of the
data, followed by Financials (21%), Consumer goods (15%), Sovereign (11%),
Automobile (4%) and other corporates (27%). Panel C shows the breakdown
by country. 37% of the CDS and asset swap are issued in the USA, 12% in
France, 11% in the Netherlands, 11% in the UK and 6% in Germany. The CDS
and asset swaps issued in these ve countries count for around 77% of all data.
The breakdown by region is shown in Panel D. The Europe has a 50% share,
followed by North America (37%) and Asia non-Japan (7%).
2.5 Results and Analysis
2.5.1 Sample and Trading Strategy
We use daily data to calculate the prot and loss of the negative and positive
basis trading strategies and implicitly assume that the investors trade at the
closing price. The closing prices of single name CDS premia, asset swap spreads
and swap rates are the quoted price from CreditTrade and Bloomberg, respec-
tively. If we do not have the closing price on that day, we skip it and roll over
to the next business day that data are available.
As there are numerous combinations of entrance trigger, holding period limit and
exit trigger, we investigate those that represent the important trading philoso-
phies. We choose 50%, 30% and 10% opening cushions, or ratios of basis and mid
CDS premia, for the entrance triggers in the study, which stand for the 'slow-in',
'normal', and 'quick-in' trading philosophies. When an investor chooses 50% as
the opening cushion, he is more risk-averse than those who choose 10% cushion
level, as he bypasses some trading opportunities.
We use 10-day, 30-day and 60-day holding period limits to check the impact
if an investor cannot hold the position for as long as he chooses. For the exit
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trigger, we choose 90% and 70% closing cushions for the unwinding decision.
The investor who has a 90% exit trigger will unwind the position when the basis
has tightened 10% with respect to the basis level when the position was opened,
and always closes the position earlier than those who have a 70% exit trigger.
We mark these two exit triggers as 'impatient' and 'patient', respectively. If the
investor is patient, he assumes that the basis will still tighten in the future and
is thus willing to hold the position longer. The impatient investor, or risk-averse
investor, will close the position when the basis tightens by a reasonable amount,
as he does not expect the basis to contract further in the near future.
The 90% upper boundary for the exit trigger is chosen because the mean rela-
tive bid-ask spread is about 5.8%. Any exit trigger higher than 90% is likely to
generate many trades where gross prots may not be sucient to cover trading
costs.
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the prot per trade with
dierent opening cushions, holding period limits and closing cushions for a neg-
ative basis trading strategy. The mean prot per trade rises and the percentage
of the trades that generate prot goes up along with increasing opening cushions
when the holding period limit and closing cushion are unchanged. The investor
has higher mean prot and more trades with prot. On average, only 22%
trading strategies generate a loss; the rest have prots. The standard deviation
of mean prot per trade rst rises then falls as the opening cushion increases.
The number of observations decreases as the opening cushion grows because
the investor bypasses some trading opportunities. The results show that mean
prot per trade and number of trades with a prot increase even if there are
less trades. As credit risk is assumed to be priced accordingly in both markets,
those which have greater dierence in CDS premium and asset swap spread are
more likely to present a converging basis. Therefore, those trades which have a
higher opening cushion generate greater prots than those trades which have a
lower opening cushion.
As we have discussed in previous section, the investor enters CDS contract and
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Table 2.5: Prots of Negative Basis Trading
The table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum value, maximum value, percentage
of trades with positive prot and number of observations when negative basis trading strategy
is used. All numbers are reported in basis points.
Panel A: Without Position Limit
Closing cushion 70 90
Holding period 10 30 60 10 30 60
Opening cushion
10 Mean -16 3 18 -15 1 11
Standard deviation 60 62 55 58 56 48
Maximum 319 319 319 319 319 319
Minimum -285 -308 -228 -285 -308 -228
Observations 3,013 2,838 2,568 3,014 2,839 2,572
% of trades with prot 32 55 74 37 60 73
30 Mean -7 16 31 -6 13 22
Standard deviation 62 58 49 59 50 42
Maximum 319 319 319 319 319 319
Minimum -285 -243 -166 -285 -233 -101
Observations 1,287 1,189 1,124 1,288 1,189 1,125
% of trades with prot 37 64 84 45 71 84
50 Mean 4 30 42 5 25 30
Standard deviation 59 53 47 56 47 44
Maximum 241 241 241 236 236 236
Minimum -150 -117 -52 -150 -116 -47
Observations 628 568 540 628 568 541
% of trades with prot 45 75 92 52 82 93
Panel B: With Position Limit
Closing cushion 70 90
Holding period 10 30 60 10 30 60
Opening cushion
Mean 20 34 40 11 22 28
Standard deviation 72 67 68 66 59 59
10 Maximum 319 319 319 319 319 319
Minimum -252 -176 -221 -252 -176 -221
Observations 298 257 234 388 352 324
% of trades with prot 65 78 85 61 75 83
Mean 18 36 47 10 23 30
Standard deviation 77 70 65 67 57 53
30 Maximum 319 319 319 319 319 319
Minimum -259 -137 -114 -259 -137 -101
Observations 169 144 128 225 208 192
% of trades with prot 60 77 88 61 76 85
Mean 27 44 55 21 35 40
Standard deviation 68 63 58 61 55 53
50 Maximum 241 241 241 213 213 213
Minimum -131 -117 -49 -131 -105 -36
Observations 98 90 82 124 120 110
% of trades with prot 68 86 91 69 83 91
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protection buyer and buys a piece of cash bond. Without loss of generality, the
investor can arbitrarily increase the notional of CDS and cash bond, given these
transactions do not have impact on market prices. We use the prot per trade
across all trades in our sample in order to fairly compare the results.
Banks apply credit line limits for each CDS and bond. We use mean prot per
trade to compare the results from dierent trading strategy for the same credit
line limits.
There is another measure which adds up all prots from basis trade. We do
not use this approach because it does not take value at risk into account. By
adding all prots together, the investor cannot directly compare two dierent
strategies as credit lines which are used are not fully identical.
We look at the total prot with dierent constellations by multiplying the mean
prot per trade by the number of observations, and nd that the strategy with a
10% opening cushion, 60-day holding period limit and 70% closing cushion gen-
erates the highest total prot. The 10% opening cushion enables the investor
to make many trades while the 60-day holding period limit and 70% closing
cushion enable prots to be reaped when the basis is converging if the credit
risk is priced accordingly in the cash bond and derivative markets.
We compare the results of prot per trade with 10-day, 30-day and 60-day hold-
ing period limits. The mean prot per trade and percentage of trades with
positive prot rise as the holding period gets longer. With a longer holding
period, the investor is less likely to be forced to liquidate the position when
the closing cushion has not yet been hit. Although there is some risk that
the basis may even widen through time, the economic relationship between the
credit derivative and the bond markets will drive the basis tighter. There is no
clear pattern for the standard deviation as the holding period limit increases,
instead, some standard deviations of prot per trade take the form of an inverse
U-shape. If we normalize the mean by the standard deviation, the strategies
with a 60-day holding period limit clearly outperform the strategies with either
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a 10-day or 30-day holding period.
When analyzing details of the mean prot per trade with 70% and 90% closing
cushions, we nd that the mean prot per trade goes down when the closing
cushion increases from 70% to 90%, except for the trading strategies with a
10-day holding period limit, albeit the dierence is small. If the basis tightens
to 90% of the old basis level and bounces back to the 100% level within 10 days,
an investor who had stuck to a 70% closing cushion would miss the chance to
unwind his position and to earn the prot. If the holding period limit was ex-
tended, the basis could have continued tightening 10. These factors make the
pattern of mean prot per trade with a 10-day holding period and 70% and 90%
closing cushions dierent from those with 30-day and 60-day holding period, re-
spectively.
We use the non-parametric Wilcoxon test to check whether the dierences in
the mean prot per trade in the sample are statistically signicant. Table 2.6
shows the Wilcoxon statistic with dierent opening cushions, holding period
limits and closing cushions.
The four columns of each panel show the test statistics for negative basis trad-
ing, with and without a position limit, and for positive basis trading with and
without a position limit.
Panel A presents the test statistics across dierent opening cushions. The mean
prot per trade of strategies with a higher opening cushion is signicantly higher
than that with a lower opening cushion at 5% signicance level. Hence, Hypoth-
esis 1 cannot be rejected.
Panel B reports the statistics when the holding period limit varies. The mean
prot per trade with a long holding period limit is signicantly higher than that
with a short holding period limit. So Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected.
10In Table 2.5, we see that the percentage of trades with prot increases as the holding
period gets longer; otherwise the percentage drops because of additional nancing costs.
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Panel C documents the test statistics of the standard deviation in strategies
with dierent holding period limits. The result shows that null hypothesis, i.e.
the standard deviation of trading strategies with a 10-day holding period limit
equals that of the strategies with a 30-day holding period limit, can be rejected.
The same result is found for the null hypothesis that the standard deviation of
trading strategies with a 10-day holding period limit equals that of the strate-
gies with a 60-day holding period limit. However, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the standard deviation of trading strategies with a 30-day hold-
ing period limit equals that of the strategies with a 60-day holding period limit
in negative basis strategy with position limit. Hypothesis 3 can thus be rejected.
Panel D shows the test statistic for two closing cushions. The mean prot per
trade with a 70% closing cushion is signicantly higher than that of the strategy
with a 90% closing cushion. So Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected.
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2.5.2 Impact of Position Limit
We also analyze the position limit feature. With the above strategy, the investor
will continue building his positions if the basis is still signicantly wide after
the rst position is opened. Since the arbitrage position is self-funded11, some
will argue that it makes sense just to increase the position at the rst day to
two-fold or more. In practice, hedge funds may take the double down strategy,
i.e. they double bets on the risky arbitrages because they regard it as an even
better chance than before. However, risk managers are likely to reject the tak-
ing of excessive positions. Hence, we assume that the investor can open only
one long position and one short position for each name. He is allowed to build
other positions for the same entity if, and only if, the previous position is closed.
Therefore, the risk is better controlled than if many positions are built with the
direct consequence that the frequency of trading has decreases notably. When
the position limit is reached, the investor has to bypass trading opportunities
even though the entrance trigger is met. We assume that the investor can have
only one long or short position in each underlying entity.
In credit markets, there are certain bases which do not converge due to the spe-
cialness of either CDS or bond. Since our strategy is based on the expectation
that credit risks are priced accordingly, we shun the cases where CDS and bond
include specialness, and concentrate on the bases where credit risk is the main
driving factor12.
Using this approach, the investor can avoid building excessive positions in those
special CDS and bonds whose credit risks do not converge. We expect a higher
mean prot per trade here than for a strategy without a position limit.
Panel B of Table 2.5 and the second column of Table 2.6 describes the arbitrage
prots for single names with position limits and tests the statistical signicance
11No upfront payment from the investor in the CDS contract.
12A concrete example is Deutsche Telekom bond 7.5% 2033. This bond has a step-up clause
in the prospectus. If Deutsche Telekom's issuer ratings, both from S&P and Moody's, are
downgraded to the grade below BBB+ and Baa1, the coupon will increase by 50 basis points.
Therefore, the DT 7.5% 2033 has a special component, and its CDS and asset swap spread
do not necessarily converge.
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using the Wilcoxon approach, respectively.
When the opening cushions for the strategies rise, we observe that mean prots
increase, which implies that the wider basis is more likely to converge than the
others. The proportion of trades with positive prots also goes up along with
increasing opening cushions. Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected when the position
limit for each individual name is imposed.
The mean prots and the proportion of positive prots increase as the holding
period limit increases. Again, the investor reaps higher prots with a longer
holding period limit to avoid interim liquidation. The second column of Ta-
ble 2.6 Panel B shows that Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected.
However, the standard deviations of the prots no longer have a hump shape.
On the contrary, the standard deviation drops with an increasing holding period
limit, except for the trading strategy with 50% opening cushion, 60-day holding
period and 90% closing cushion. With the position limit, the investor will not
take further positions if the basis does not tighten. Hence, he avoids trading
bases which do not converge. Hypothesis 3 is thus rejected.
The mean prots and proportion of positive prots go down when the closing
cushions expands. When the closing cushion is 90%, the mean prots and pro-
portion of positive prots are lower than those with 70% closing cushion. So
Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected.
By placing the position limit, the investor could avoid taking excessive risk
when the basis does not tighten in a considerable period of time. Although
the number of trades is only around 16% of those without a position limit, the
investor can be much better o as the mean prot is higher. Since the position
is self-funded, i.e. he could raise the notional amount invested in every trade if
he has access to the capital market, the investor prefers the strategies with a
position limit because of the higher mean prots.
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2.5.3 Impact of Rating, Sub-periods, Sector and Currency
The basis smile eect is well documented in previous researches. The basis at
the high and low ends of the rating spectrum is higher than for those in the
middle of the spectrum. The underlying names with a high rating, such as Aaa
or Aa, usually have very low or even negative asset swap spreads as their credit
quality is higher than that of Libor. Given that the CDS premium is greater
than zero by denition, we observe a positive basis for the higher rating classes.
The basis of lower rating classes, Baa or below, is also expected to be positive
due to the thin supply of the CDS protection. Hence, a high CDS premium
drives the basis wider. The stylized facts of the basis smile suggest that the dis-
crepancy between the CDS premium and asset swap spread is rating dependent,
and aects prots and losses in basis trading. We incorporate rating dummy
variables into our calculations to check whether the impact of the rating class
is substantial.
We also add the industry and currency dummy variables to check if the dierent
industries or the currency of the underlying have any inuence on the prots
from the basis trading.
As the market is maturing, more investors will exploit the mis-pricing between
two markets, which could substantially remove possible arbitrage opportunities.
We also incorporate a time trend variable into the model to capture the impact
of market maturity on prots from basis trading.
The regression equation is thus formed:
i = c+ TimeTi + AaaDAaa;i + BaaDBaa;i
+CurDCur;i + AutomobileDAutomobile;i + FinancialDFinancial;i
+ConsumerDConsumer;i + Telco UtilityDTelco Utility;i + i;
(2.3)
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where c is the constant, DAaa, DBaa are dummy variables for the rating class
Aaa/Aa and Baa13, DCur is dummy variable for the denominated currency,
DAutomobile, DFinancial, DConsumer and DTelco Utility are dummy variables for
the sectors of automobile, nancial and insurance, consumer goods and telecom-
munications and utilities sectors, respectively. T captures the time trend, which
is calculated as the year when the position is built minus 2001.
Table 2.7: Linear regression using prots from negative and positive basis trad-
ing
The table reports the results of various regressions for negative and positive basis trading
strategies with dierent combination of exogenous variables. The t-statistics, R-squared and
number of observation are also shown.
Negative basis Negative basis Positive basis Positive basis
without with without with
position limit position limit position limit position limit
Currency 13.9 1.5 44.6 17.8
(12.79)** (0.56) (16.42)** (4.11)**
Automobile 9.3 -18.1 -7.2 0.3
(5.22)** (3.34)** (1.11) (0.03)
Financials -1.0 -7.7 -28.4 -19.7
(0.86) (2.26)* (8.66)** (3.84)**
Consumer goods -25.6 -8.4 -10.2 -6.6
(17.07)** (11.31)** (2.65)** (0.95)
Telco/Utility -5.3 26.4 -55.8 -19.3
(3.79)** (7.46)** (19.22)** (3.81)**
Aaa/Aa -9.7 -12.5 55.0 19.1
(8.89)** (4.14)** (21.17)** (4.21)**
Baa -10.8 -25.6 -68.6 -74.6
(8.75)** (6.80)** (24.65)** (15.32)**
Time trend -9.9 -8.3 16.7 5.1
(23.64)** (7.64)** (23.59)** (3.92)**
Constant 20.9 44.7 -85.6 -27.2
(21.23)** (20.6)** (30.26)** (3.31)**
Observations 27,519 3,537 103,278 19,961
R-squared 3% 8% 3% 2%
* signicant at 5% level
** signicant at 1% level
The results are reported in Table 2.7. The rst two columns of Table 2.7 show
the parameter estimates and t-statistics of negative basis trading strategies with
and without a position limit, respectively. We run a least-square regression with
several groups of exogenous variables, such as time trend, rating class, currency
and industrial sector.
13As we have grouped ratings Aaa, Aa, A and Baa, the rest of the names have an A rating.
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In the rst column, we show the parameter estimates of the negative basis trad-
ing strategy without a position limit. The coecient on the currency dummy
variable is -34 bps and is statistically signicant, which suggests that basis
trading with US$-denominated names generates higher prots than that with
euro-denominated names. The signicance and sign of the coecients on indus-
try sector dummy variables are mixed. The coecient for the automobile sector
is negative and signicant, while for consumer goods it is positive and signi-
cant. The coecients on nancials and telco and utilities are not statistically
signicant. Basis trading in the consumer goods sector generates on average
59.1 bps prots higher than the others, while the automobile sector gives on
average 12.5 bps prots lower prots. Both Aaa/Aa and Baa rating dummies
are statistically signicant and negative. The prots per trade of basis trading
with Aaa/Aa and Baa ratings are 8.1 bps and 6.2 bps lower than the prots per
trade with A rating, respectively. The coecients for the time trend is 1.8 bps,
which suggests that on average the prot per trade increases along the time axis.
The estimates for the negative basis trading strategy with a position limit are
reported in the second column. The coecient on the currency dummy variable
is signicant and negative at -11.9 bps. This is in line with the results of the
trading strategy without a position limit. Additionally, the coecients on indus-
try sector dummy variables, such as automobile, nancial, and consumer goods
have the same sign and statistical signicance as those of the trading strategy
without position limit. The only exception is that the coecient for the telco
and utility sector dummy variable is now positive and statistically signicant.
In contrast, the coecient is negative and insignicant when there is no posi-
tion limit. The coecients for rating dummy variables have the same sign and
statistical signicance as those of the trading strategy without a position limit.
From the regression results, we nd that the coecients on rating dummy vari-
ables are negative and statistically signicant for trading strategies both with
and without position limits. Therefore, we cannot reject Hypothesis 5. However,
the tests on the null hypothesis that prot per trade decreases as the market
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gets more mature give mixed results. When the investor has no position limit,
the prot per trade on average can even increase along the time axis. The prot
per trade decreases when the investor has a position limit. Hence, we can reject
Hypothesis 6 when there is no position limit, but cannot reject it when there is.
2.5.4 Analysis of Positive Basis
Table 2.8 presents the mean and standard deviation of prots from positive ba-
sis trading. Comparing the mean prot per trade with that of negative basis
trading, we nd that the mean values of positive basis trading are substantially
lower than those of negative basis trading.
The changes in mean prot per trade due to the changes in opening cushion,
holding period limit and closing cushion are similar to those of a negative basis
trade: the mean prot per trade increases as the opening cushion goes up, the
holding period limit is longer and the closing cushion is lower. The inverse U-
shape standard deviation is observed when the holding period limit is 30-days.
We nd the standard deviation declines with 10-day and 60-day holding period
limits. Table 2.6 shows the statistical test of the hypothesis. From these results,
Hypothesis 1, 2 and 4 cannot be rejected but Hypothesis 3 is rejected.
The strategies with a position limit perform better. When the opening cushion
is greater than or equal to 30%, the holding period limit is longer than or equal
to 30-days and the closing cushion is 70%, the mean prots are between 18 bps
and 47 bps. The investor has avoided taking excessive positions that are less
likely to converge by implementing the position limit. Nevertheless, the results
of mean prot per trade are falling like a stone when the investor switches from
the negative basis trading with a position limit to the positive basis trading with
a position limit. The mean prot per trade of strategies with negative basis is
higher than that of strategies with positive basis; while the standard deviation of
strategies with negative basis is lower than that of strategies with positive basis.
The third and fourth columns of Table 2.7 reports the parameter estimates and
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Table 2.8: Prots of Positive Basis Trading
The table reports the mean prot, standard deviation, dierent quantiles, minimum value,
maximum value, percentage of trades with positive prot and number of observations when
positive basis trading strategy is used. All numbers are reported in basis point.
Panel A: Without Position Limit
Closing cushion 70 90
Holding period 10 30 60 10 30 60
Opening cushion
Mean -48 -28 -6 -45 -34 -24
Standard deviation 263 273 200 208 187 153
10 Maximum 1,402 1,520 1,657 1,354 902 902
Minimum -5,991 - 6,551 -5,722 -5,750 -6,355 -5,750
Observations 10,454 9,654 8,448 10,451 9,650 8,443
% of trades with prot 29 43 52 22 26 29
Mean -15 8 22 -13 -4 0
Standard deviation 212 179 170 144 121 129
30 Maximum 1,402 1,520 1,657 1,354 902 902
Minimum -5,529 -5,006 -5,006 -5,750 -5,750 -5,750
Observations 5,105 4,637 4,048 5,101 4,633 4,044
% of trades with prot 35 52 62 31 37 41
Mean 1 9 16 -1 3 6
Standard deviation 63 66 64 50 49 48
50 Maximum 857 857 857 613 613 613
Minimum -524 -402 -121 -524 -402 -210
Observations 2,684 2,490 2,201 2,683 2,489 2,200
% of trades with prot 38 54 66 41 49 55
Panel B: With Position Limit
Closing cushion 70 90
Holding period 10 30 60 10 30 60
Opening cushion
Mean -23 -10 1 -42 -31 -25
Standard deviation 146 158 145 205 210 181
10 Maximum 694 747 747 747 902 902
Minimum -1,640 -2,784 -2,778 -5,722 -6,551 -5,722
Observations 1,082 1,001 875 2,957 2,756 2,427
% of trades with prot 34 41 46 21 25 28
Mean -1 23 36 -15 -2 2
Standard deviation 163 155 131 187 183 193
30 Maximum 876 1,080 876 876 902 902
Minimum -1,995 -1,002 -756 -5,750 -5,750 -5,750
Observations 555 497 439 1,439 1,318 1,158
% of trades with prot 45 59 65 30 37 41
Mean 14 32 38 2 7 10
Standard deviation 106 113 116 65 66 67
50 Maximum 850 850 850 613 613 613
Minimum -167 -266 -121 -219 -266 -146
Observations 297 265 239 785 737 660
% of trades with prot 47 66 72 39 48 53
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t-statistics of the time trend, the rating class, the currency and the industrial
sector dummy variables. The parameter estimates on currency dummy variables
are signicant. Basis trading with euro-denominated cash bonds and CDS gives
a higher prot on average. The coecients with the industry sector dummy
variables gives a mixed pictures. The coecients on the dummy variable of the
automobile sector are not statistically signicant. Contrarily, the coecient on
consumer goods sector from positive basis without a position limit is signicant
and negative; the coecients on nancials and telco and utility sectors are neg-
ative and signicant.
The coecients on Aaa/Aa rating dummy variables are positive and signicant,
which diers from those of negative basis trading with negative and signicant
parameter estimates. The coecients on Baa rating dummy variables are nega-
tive and signicant, and have the same sign and signicance as those of negative
basis trading. So Hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected. The coecient estimates on
time trend is positive and signicant for the positive basis trading strategy with-
out position limit, but insignicant for the positive basis trading strategy with
position limit. Hence, Hypothesis 6 is rejected.
The mean prots of positive basis trading are substantially lower than those of
negative basis trading. There are several factors driving the bad performance
of positive basis trading.
First, bid-ask spreads of CDS premia in positive basis trading have higher mean
values than those in negative basis trading. The bid-ask spread, a proxy for the
liquidity of the CDS contract, is an exogenous variable which does not depend on
the sign of the basis. A high bid-ask spread implies low liquidity in the market.
Table 2.9 shows that the mean bid-ask spreads of positive basis trading are sub-
stantially higher than those of negative basis trading when the holding period
limit is 10-days. The dierence declines with increasing holding period limits.
Since the dierence between CDS premia is discounted for ve years from the
date of building, one basis point of trading costs lowers the prot by about 4 bps.
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Table 2.9: Decomposition of Prot and Loss
The table reports the mean CDS premia, mean bid-ask spreads of CDS premia, mean prot
per trade, mean prots given prot and mean prots given loss for both positive and negative
basis trading strategies. Dierent trading strategies are used. All numbers are reported in
basis point.
Panel A: Negative basis trading without position limit
Closing cushion 70 90
Holding period 10 30 60 10 30 60
Opening
cushion
Mean CDS premia 45 44 43 45 44 43
Mean bid-ask spreads 9 9 9 9 9 9
10 Mean prot per trade, overall -16 3 18 -15 1 11
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 43 42 40 34 30 29
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -44 -46 -46 -44 -44 -38
Mean CDS premia 35 34 34 35 34 34
Mean bid-ask spreads 8 8 7 8 8 7
30 Mean prot per trade, overall -7 16 31 -6 13 22
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 47 45 43 36 31 30
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -40 -34 -31 -41 -33 -23
Mean CDS premia 30 28 28 30 28 28
Mean bid-ask spreads 7 7 6 7 7 7
50 Mean prot per trade, overall 4 30 42 5 25 30
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 49 48 46 40 35 33
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -33 -24 -16 -34 -21 -10
Panel B: Negative basis trading with position limit
Closing cushion 70 90
Holding period 10 30 60 10 30 60
Opening
cushion
Mean CDS premia 51 50 51 48 47 48
Mean bid-ask spreads 10 9 9 9 8 9
10 Mean prot per trade, overall 20 34 40 11 22 28
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 55 55 56 45 41 42
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -45 -44 -53 -42 -36 -38
Mean CDS premia 38 37 37 36 35 35
Mean bid-ask spreads 9 8 8 8 7 7
30 Mean prot per trade, overall 18 36 47 10 23 30
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 60 60 59 44 40 39
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -47 -45 -48 -44 -32 -25
Mean CDS premia 33 32 32 30 30 30
Mean bid-ask spreads 8 7 7 7 7 6
50 Mean prot per trade, overall 27 44 55 21 35 40
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 58 58 62 47 46 45
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -39 -37 -21 -36 -21 -13
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Decomposition of Prot and Loss: continued
Panel C: Positive basis trading without position limit
Closing cushion 70 90
Holding period 10 30 60 10 30 60
Opening
cushion
Mean CDS premia 184 178 168 184 178 168
Mean bid-ask spreads 20 19 17 20 19 17
10 Mean prot per trade, overall -68 -57 -41 -64 -57 -46
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 58 62 64 47 44 43
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -118 -146 -150 -94 -92 -82
Mean CDS premia 107 100 94 107 100 93
Mean bid-ask spreads 12 11 10 12 11 10
30 Mean prot per trade, overall -35 -25 -10 -31 -24 -14
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 61 64 65 48 43 43
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -86 -120 -128 -65 -64 -52
Mean CDS premia 34 33 28 34 33 28
Mean bid-ask spreads 5 5 4 5 5 4
50 Mean prot per trade, overall -6 6 14 -7 2 5
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 43 41 36 27 25 23
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -36 -34 -29 -31 -19 -17
Panel D: Positive basis trading with position limit
Closing cushion 70 90
Holding period 10 30 60 10 30 60
Opening
cushion
Mean CDS premia 120 118 116 133 128 125
Mean bid-ask spreads 16 15 14 15 14 13
10 Mean prot per trade, overall -34 -15 0 -54 -44 -35
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 55 56 62 45 45 44
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -78 -64 -53 -79 -74 -65
Mean CDS premia 108 96 89 86 81 76
30 Mean bid-ask spreads 13 11 10 10 9 8
Mean prot per trade, overall -17 20 32 -30 -19 -6
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 68 73 72 50 49 51
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -83 -55 -41 -63 -58 -46
Mean CDS premia 47 44 39 35 33 29
50 Mean bid-ask spreads 7 7 6 5 5 5
Mean prot per trade, overall 1 9 40 -9 6 10
Mean prot per trade given positive prots 67 64 63 38 35 33
Mean prot per trade given negative prots -57 -98 -24 -39 -21 -17
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Secondly, We observe more positive basis in our sample. Let us look at the in-
volved transaction of positive basis trade. To trade positive basis, the investor
sells a bond and enters a CDS contract as protection seller. In this strategy, the
investor needs to borrow the bond, which is usually dicult in bond market.
Therefore, the number of positive bases is higher than that of negative bases as
positive bases trade is dicult to implement. We also observe that the mean
prot per trade of positive basis is lower than that of negative basis. The main
reason is that positive bases do not converge as positive basis trade is dicult
to implement. If the strategy were easy to implement, investors would have
sold bonds and entered CDS contract as protection seller. These transactions
would have driven CDS premia higher and asset swap spreads of bonds lower,
and bases would have converged.
Thirdly, we nd the mean prots are conditional on the prot or loss. If trades
generate prot, mean prots are close for positive and negative basis trading,
while if trades generate losses, they are substantially dierent in the two trading
strategies. In Table 2.9, we observe lower mean prots for positive basis if the
trades generate losses. When the creditworthiness of the underlying deteriorates,
an investors will buy CDS protection regardless of the price14. Unfortunately,
in this case, the investor who executes his trading strategy according to the
opening cushion, holding period limit and closing cushion, writes the CDS pro-
tection. And as the basis widens again, the trading strategy backres and the
investor suers substantial losses.
Lastly, the higher CDS premium incorporates the cheapest-to-deliver option.
Such an additional character in the CDS contract may justify the discrepancy
between the CDS premium and asset swap spread, especially a higher CDS pre-
mium, as both credit risk and the CTD-option are priced into the CDS premium.
14As stylized facts, we see many investors were better buyers of CDS contracts when there
was massive unwinding of synthetic CDOs and covering positions of Lehman Brothers and
Icelandic banks in the second half of 2008. The CDS quotes, especially ask quotes, were very
high and sometimes did not even exist.
2.6. CONCLUSION 49
2.6 Conclusion
Our study checks the relationship between CDS premia and asset swap spreads
by implementing basis trading strategies. We replicate the strategies used by
traders using asset swap for the perceived interest rate risk. This paper provides
essential analysis for evaluating these various strategies. We nd that there are
positive mean prots per trade when appropriate basis trading strategies are im-
plemented to exploit the dierent prices for credit risk in credit derivative and
bond markets. Mean prots depend on the rating class and industrial sector,
while the time trend is of mixed statistical signicance and aects the prots
from the basis trading. In general, mean prots from negative basis trading are
higher than those from positive basis trading due to trading costs and the credit
risk exposure.
To earn higher prots, the investor needs to open a position when the basis
is wide and close it when the basis has tightened substantially. A less strict
holding period limit raises the mean prot per trade. If there is a position limit
for each individual name, mean prots are also higher. These ndings have
important implications for market participants when there is a disconnection
between CDS and asset swap spreads.
An out-of-sample approach would be helpful to determine and compare the re-
sults of dierent trading strategies.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 A Concrete Example
We now look at a concrete example with US$10m notional amount. Citigroup's
ve-year CDS with quarterly payment is quoted at 28/36 on 25 April 2002. The
28/36 is a pair of bid and ask quotes, which means the dealer is to ask for 36bps
for the CDS protection and to give away the CDS protection for 28bps. The
asset swap spread of Citigroup's cash bond (ISIN: US201615DL29) is quoted at
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51.10 bps. The bond has semiannual coupon payment and the redemption date
is 15 November 2006. The day count conventions are 30/360 and actual/360 for
the bond and CDS, respectively.
Table 2.10: A Concrete Example
Panel A: CDS Quotes (bps)
Date Bid Ask
25 April 2002 28 36
6 May 2002 40 50
Panel B: Asset Swap Spreads (bps)
Date Spread
25 April 2002 51.1
6 May 2002 49.54
Panel C: 3-mo Libor (in %)
Date Rate
25 April 2002 1.93%
6 May 2002 1.92%
Panel D: Accrued Interest of Asset Swap Floating Leg (in %)
Accrued interest of Accrued interest of Prot
asset swap when asset swap when of
opening the position closing the position Libor
0.4676% 0.5368% 0.0002%
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Table 2.10(a) - (c) shows the quotes of the CDS premia, asset swap spreads,
and Libor. The basis spread is -19.1 bps. Suppose this the basis spread level
meets the entrance trigger for the trading strategy, the investor executes the
trading strategy by entering the ve-year CDS contract as protection buyer. In
the meantime, he longs the bond with the same face value at the dirty price, i.e.
he pays both clean price and accrued interest of the bond. The investor imme-
diately enters the asset swap contract at the asset swap spread, i.e., he agrees
to transfer the semiannual payments to the counterparty, which is the same as
the coupon payment of the bond. The counterparty agrees to pay the investor
Libor rate plus asset swap spread on a quarterly basis. The Libor rate is 1.93%
and the asset swap spread is 51.1 bps on that day. The day count conventions
are 30/360 and actual/360 for the xed leg and oating leg, respectively.
If the bond is traded below (above) par, the investor pays (receives from) the
dealer the dierence between par value and the bond's clean price. Furthermore,
the investor pays the accrued interest from asset swap oating leg and receives
the accrued interest from the bond coupon payment. There are 69 days between
the last oating leg payment and now (from 15 February 2002 to 25 April 2002,
see the second column in Panel E). The payment of the accrued interest on the
bond coupon cancels out the amount received from the accrued interest from
the xed leg of the asset swap. Therefore, the investor's total cash outow at
25 April 2002 is US$10,046,760 15.
The investor borrows this cash outow in the overnight market at the Fed fund
rate of 1.88% that day. If he is going to roll over his loan to the next day, the
Fed fund rate will change. Fed fund rates are reported in Panel H.
On 6 May 2002, the CDS is quoted at 40/50, and the asset swap spread is
49.54bps. If we assume the exit trigger of the trading strategy is not met but
the holding period limit is, the investor unwinds his position that day. He ter-
minates the CDS contract with the counterparty and pays the accrued interest
on the CDS. The day count convention of CDS is actual/360 and the holding
15It equals the face value plus the accrued interest for the oating leg of the asset swap.
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A Concrete Example: Continued
Panel E: Discount Factor for Cash Flows of Asset Swap
Payment Actual days from Actual days from Discount Actual Prot
structure of the day when the day when factor days of asset
asset swap position is opened position is closed swap
2/17/1997 -1893 -1904
5/15/1997 -1806 -1817
8/15/1997 -1714 -1725
11/17/1997 -1620 -1631
2/16/1998 -1529 -1540
5/15/1998 -1441 -1452
8/17/1998 -1347 -1358
11/16/1998 -1256 -1267
2/15/1999 -1165 -1176
5/17/1999 -1074 -1085
8/16/1999 -983 -994
11/15/1999 -892 -903
2/15/2000 -800 -811
5/15/2000 -710 -721
8/15/2000 -618 -629
11/15/2000 -526 -537
2/15/2001 -434 -445
5/15/2001 -345 -356
8/15/2001 -253 -264
11/15/2001 -161 -172
2/15/2002 -69 -80
5/15/2002 20 9 0.99881 9 0.000004
8/15/2002 112 101 0.98668 92 0.000039
11/15/2002 204 193 0.97469 92 0.000039
2/17/2003 298 287 0.9626 94 0.000039
5/15/2003 385 374 0.95154 87 0.000036
8/15/2003 477 466 0.93998 92 0.000037
11/17/2003 571 560 0.92832 94 0.000038
2/16/2004 662 651 0.91717 91 0.000036
5/17/2004 753 742 0.90615 91 0.000036
8/16/2004 844 833 0.89527 91 0.000035
11/15/2004 935 924 0.88451 91 0.000035
2/15/2005 1027 1016 0.87377 92 0.000035
5/16/2005 1117 1106 0.86339 90 0.000034
8/15/2005 1208 1197 0.85301 91 0.000034
11/15/2005 1300 1289 0.84265 92 0.000034
2/15/2006 1392 1381 0.83242 92 0.000033
5/15/2006 1481 1470 0.82264 89 0.000032
8/15/2006 1573 1562 0.81265 92 0.000032
11/15/2006 1665 1654 0.80278 92 0.000032
0.000640
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Table 2.10 A Concrete Example: Continued
Panel F: Risky Discount Factor for Cash Flows of CDS
Payment Actual days from Risky Actual DF01
structure of the day when discount days
CDS position is closed factors
7/25/2002 80 0.98859 80 0.219687
10/25/2002 172 0.97564 92 0.249330
1/27/2003 266 0.96258 94 0.251340
4/25/2003 354 0.95051 88 0.232347
7/25/2003 445 0.93819 91 0.237154
10/27/2003 539 0.92563 94 0.241692
1/26/2004 630 0.91363 91 0.230945
4/26/2004 721 0.90178 91 0.227950
7/26/2004 812 0.89009 91 0.224995
10/25/2004 903 0.87855 91 0.222078
1/25/2005 995 0.86704 92 0.221577
4/25/2005 1085 0.85592 90 0.213980
7/25/2005 1176 0.84483 91 0.213554
10/25/2005 1268 0.83376 92 0.213072
1/25/2006 1360 0.82283 92 0.210279
4/25/2006 1450 0.81228 90 0.203070
7/25/2006 1541 0.80175 91 0.202665
10/25/2006 1633 0.79124 92 0.202206
1/25/2007 1725 0.78087 92 0.199556
4/25/2007 1815 0.77086 90 0.192715
4.410191
Panel G: Accrued Interest and Prot of CDS Premia (in %)
Accrued Interest Prot from
of CDS change of CDS
-0.0110% 0.1764%
Table 2.10 A Concrete Example: Continued
Panel H: Funding Cost
Fed Fund Rate 1/360 Factor Compounded Interest
0.0188 0.0001 1.0001
0.0181 0.0001 1.0001 1.000102
0.0181 0.0001 1.0001 1.000153
0.0181 0.0001 1.0001 1.000203
0.0181 0.0001 1.0001 1.000253
0.0188 0.0001 1.0001 1.000304
0.0188 0.0001 1.0001 1.000356
0.0181 0.0001 1.0001 1.000408
0.0175 0.0000 1.0000 1.000458
0.0175 0.0000 1.0000 1.000507
0.0175 0.0000 1.0000 1.000556
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period is 10 days. Given the CDS premium of 50bps on 6 May 2002, we calcu-
late that the accrued interest on the CDS is US$1,100 (see Panel G). The net
present value of the change in the CDS premium is calculated using the risky
discounting curve. Since the ask quote on 25 April 2002 is 4bps lower than the
bid quote on 6 May, the prot due to the change of CDS premium is US$17,640.
The total prot from the CDS part is US$16,54016.
The cash ow from the asset swap part is composed of the prot from the change
in asset swap spreads, the change in Libor, and the accrued interest from the
asset swap oating leg (see Panels D and E). The cash ow from the change
in the asset swap spread is calculated using the risk-less discounting curve. As
the dierence is now 1.56bps, the net present value is US$6,400. The Libor
rate on 25 April 2002 is 1.93%, so the cash ow from the Libor's change is
Libor  20=360  DF01  10 million, which is US$20. There are 20 days be-
tween 25 April 2002 and 15 May 2002. DF01 is the discount factor at the rst
payment of the oating leg. The Libor for other future payment dates are not
relevant since they cancel each other out. These two cash ows from the asset
swap part total US$6,420.
The investor pays back the loan from the overnight market. The Fed fund rates
of the following days are shown in Panel H. The accrued interest from the asset
swap oating leg is US$53,680. We aggregate the accrued interest from the asset
swap oating leg and calculate a net payment of US$1,33417.
If the bond is priced below (above) par, the investor receives (pays) the dif-
ference between the par value and the bond's clean price from (to) the dealer.
Afterwards, he sells the bond in the market at the dirty price. Hence, the eect
of the dirty price is netted out and he receives the par value for certain.
The prot of this round-trip trading is the sum of the cash ow of CDS, asset
swap and the overnight market loan. The investor earns US$24,294 prot here18.
16By subtracting US$1,100 from US$17,640.
17The principal and interest are US$10,046,760 and US$5,586. By subtracting them from
US$10,053,680, we calculate a change of US$1,334.
18We add the US$16,540, US$6,420 and US$1,334.
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2.7.2 The Prot per Trade of Selected Trading Strategies
Fig 2.2 to Fig 2.13 show the distribution of the prots of all trades with negative
and positive trading strategies throughout the time. Fig 2.2 to Fig 2.4 report
the prot per trade of negative trading strategies without position limit, while
Fig 2.5 to Fig 2.7 present that with position limit. Fig 2.8 to Fig 2.10 show
the prot per trade of negative trading strategies without position limit and
Fig 2.11 to Fig 2.13 report that with position limit.
Most of the trades take place in the earlier period of the whole sample. The
trades are less observed after year 2004. Moreover, we nd extreme losses in
the positive basis trading part. In the left part of Fig 2.8, we nd that one
trade even generates more than 100% losses. One can easily recall the credit
event happened in the autumn of 2001: the collapse of Enron. Furthermore,
some losses between 20% and 80% are also found in the same gure, which
are generated by the trades with Alcatel, sovereign debt of Brazil, and Enron,
respectively. To sell the CDS at normal rate and buy them back in an inated
price shortly is the main reason for these deep under water losses.
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2.7.3 Data quality
We have checked outliers in CDS premia and asset swap spreads of both nega-
tive and positive basis strategies.
Positive basis strategy
Basis trades with signicant losses (greater than 5% per trade) are not due to
data error. Here is a list of entity and respective basis trades with signicant
losses.
Table 2.11: List of possible outliers
Entity name Trades
Alcatel 332
AT&T 14
Bayerische Hypo-Vereinsbank 4
Brazil 301
Colombia 124
Commerzbank 6
Deutsche Telekom 5
ENRON 194
France Telecom 31
Philippines 11
Qwest 27
Turkey 182
TYCO 600
Venezuela 236
Verizon 40
VNU 27
Grand Total 2,134
The number of trades in the second column consists of the trades in all eighteen
strategies (opening trigger, holding period limit, and closing trigger).
The main reason for these negative results is the fast deteriorating credit qual-
ity. In this case, the CDS premium usually deteriorates more than asset swap
spread. Additionally, the bid and ask spreads have substantially widened in this
circumstance; and investors paid higher round-trip trading costs.
In this list, Enron, Alcatel, and Tyco all had bumpy times in 2001. Enron went
bust, and the other two were restructured. They comprised 1,126 trades, which
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was more than 50% of total trades. AT&T, France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom,
Quest, Verizon, and VNU have shown hikes in CDS and asset swap spreads in
2002 due to systemic risks in Telco sector, driven by WorldCom event. These
Telco companies comprised only 144 trades, less than 5% of total trades.
Brazil, Philippines, Columbia, Turkey, and Venezuela comprised 854 trades
when investors were burdened by emerging markets when Argentina defaulted
in 2001.
The negative results are very often when we have a longer holding period limit.
As the investor opens his position, and in a certain time period there was an
credit event, such as Enron or Alcatel, which force him to close the position
when holding period limit is met.
If we had excluded these trades out of our sample, the results would be biased
as investors did not know a priori these idiosyncratic or sector risks.
Negative basis strategy
The problem we nd is the data point of Carnival Corp as at May 8, 2002. This
one will be deleted.
Chapter 3
The Determinants of the
Basis
3.1 Introduction
One of the main risks when investing in a debt security is credit risk, i.e. the
risk due to uncertainty about a counterparty's ability to meet payment obliga-
tions. Credit derivatives can help investors and corporations manage the credit
risk of their investments by providing insurance against adverse movements in
the counterparty's creditworthiness. If the borrower defaults, the losses on the
investment will be at least partly oset by the insurance payments. Thus, credit
derivatives can provide a way to decrease in total credit risk exposure.
In spite of the downturn in most other markets, the market for credit derivatives
has dramatically expanded within the last ten years. According to a recent sur-
vey by ISDA [2009], the global credit derivatives market grew from virtually zero
in 1993 to $40 billion in 1996. In 2008, it reached an outstanding notional value
of $38.6 trillion. Credit default swaps (CDS) make up by far the largest share of
the market for credit derivatives and are traded for two main reasons: to man-
age credit risk and to earn income.19 First, pure credit risk can be transferred
directly from one party to another without actually transferring ownership of
19Tax and balance sheet considerations also induce investments in CDS.
3.1. INTRODUCTION 71
the debt instruments themselves. Secondly, CDS may be used speculatively to
take a view on the deterioration or the improvement in the credit quality of a
reference credit exposure. These strategies aimed at exploiting the dierences
between cash bond markets and credit default swap markets have become known
as 'trading the basis', where the basis is dened as the CDS spread minus the
bond spread.
In this paper, we focus on the panel structure and the determinants of the CDS
premia, credit spreads and the basis. Since the credit derivatives market and
the bond market should be strongly interdependent as both are a medium for
trading default risk, we rst try to identify the relationship between single is-
sues through unit root tests and Johansen cointegration tests. The latter allow
us to determine whether a similar behavior exists in the long run. To extend
this approach, we apply a vector autoregressive model and thus probe whether
price movements in one market spread instantaneously into the other. A fur-
ther analysis through a vector error correction model is used to investigate the
direction, strength and rapidity with which these changes occur. After estab-
lishing the relationship of the two markets, we turn to a direct analysis of the
basis, of its sensitivity both to specic issues and to general factors like equity
returns, volatility and liquidity. As an alternative to the fairly standard use of
rst dierences, we propose the use of a xed-eects estimation that allows us
to simultaneously capture the eect of the previous period on the subsequent
period, and the additional eect of the regression variables.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2, we de-
scribe the markets in which bonds and CDS are traded. Section 3.3 summarizes
theoretical and empirical studies on bond yield spreads, CDS and the basis. A
descriptive analysis of our raw data and the sampling process applied is followed
by a description of the time series in section 3.4 and 3.5. Basic econometric
properties are explored in section 3.5.4. An empirical analysis of the determi-
nants of CDS premia, credit spreads and the basis is conducted within the xed
eects model in section 3.6. Section 3.7 summarizes and concludes.
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3.2 Bond and CDS Markets
3.2.1 The bond market
Bond markets match government agencies and companies intending to borrow
capital at a predictable cost over a xed period of time with investors who have
funds to lend.
The major issuers of bonds are central governments, government agencies, mu-
nicipals and corporates. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has es-
timated a growth from an aggregate value of $28 trillion in 1995 to $38 trillion
in 2001. Generally, a central government is the largest single issuer of bonds,
but the aggregate corporate sector has a higher amount of outstanding debt
(approximately 60% since 2000.)
Once issued, bonds are bought by numerous institutions, including mutual
funds, pension funds, insurance companies, banks and private households.
Overall, the secondary market is strongly dominated by well-informed institu-
tional investors who seek to buy long-standing credit obligations that can be
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easily sold in the market. Since bonds represent a contractual obligation of the
issuer to investors, interest is paid in regular intervals and provides the bond-
holder with a regular and predictable cash ow. Although bond prices may
uctuate considerably, an investor can rely on each coupon payment and the
eventual repayment of face value. In addition, bonds oer the chance to match
the duration of assets and liabilities, and allow diversication of an investment
portfolio to reduce the overall risk prole. Their interest rate sensitivity makes
bonds a common instrument for interest rate hedging and speculation.
The secondary market is mainly organized as an OTC market, with the excep-
tion of a few organized secondary bond markets such as the New York Stock
Exchange Automated Bond System (NYSE ABS), but these do not usually pro-
vide a liquid market without arbitrage opportunities.
3.2.2 The CDS Market
A credit default swap constitutes the exchange of a fee, paid by the default pro-
tection buyer, for a payment by the default protection seller if a credit default
event on a given reference asset occurs. The default protection can be purchased
on almost every debt instrument, including loans, bonds, sovereign and deriva-
tive contracts. The default payment usually equals the dierence between the
original value of the reference asset and its recovery value. In this respect, the
payments associated with the CDS are very similar to those for an insurance
contract: in return for regular premium payments, any shortfall due to adverse
credit events is borne by the protection seller. But in contrast to insurance,
the buyer need not have an insurable interest in the debt instrument but may
merely speculate that a credit event will occur.
CDS contracts can dier with regard to the maturity, the notional amount, the
denition of the credit event, the protection buyer's and seller's payments, and
so forth. Naturally, buyers would want to interpret the scope of protection as
widely as possible, while sellers would want to interpret it narrowly. The In-
ternational Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Guidelines has therefore
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Table 3.1: CD Market Participants
The table gives the percentage market share of the market participants. The per-
centages for 2004 are estimates. Source: BBA Credit Derivatives Report.
Buyers Sellers
Year 2001 2003 2004 (pred.) 2001 2003 2004 (pred.)
Commercial Banks 52 51 47 39 38 32
Securities Houses 21 16 17 16 16 15
Hedge Funds 12 16 19 10 13 16
Insurers 6 7 8 33 20 33
Corporates 4 5 7 2 4 4
Governments 2 2 2 { { {
published standard guidelines for these properties in its 2002 Master Agreement
and in the new 2003 credit derivatives denition.
Most key CDS market participants act as buyers and sellers simultaneously.
Commercial banks have historically been the largest players in the CDS market.
On the buyers' side, they account for approximately 50% of all transactions, but
insurers are predicted to catch up with them on the sellers' side in 2004. Over-
all, commercial banks, securities houses and insurance companies still constitute
the majority of market participants. Hedge funds which emerged as protection
buyers in 2001, are expected to overtake securities houses as sellers in 2004.
Most activity in the CDS market is handled through intermediary dealers in
the OTC trade who provide liquidity to CDS buyers and sellers, trade for their
own accounts and put together and manage structured portfolio products. Cur-
rent price ranges for CDS can be obtained either from internet platforms, the
largest of which are Creditex and CreditTrade, or via telephone from another
broker. These provide reference prices for marking-to-market existing transac-
tions based on average prices supplied by dealers and on trade prices in the
inter-dealer market. A number of large intermediaries also publish indicative
bid and oer CDS price quotes for the most frequently traded sovereigns on
their websites.
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Although the CDS market is signicantly smaller than the bond market, the
ISDA denitions have led to a higher degree of standardization. Trading is con-
centrated at certain maturities, mainly ve years, whereas bonds have dierent
maturities and coupon payments. This may simplify CDS hedging for interme-
diaries and result in tighter bid-oer spreads.
In addition, CDS markets have the potential to become more liquid than bond
markets for the following reasons: If companies issue debt infrequently or if long-
term investors hold most of the debt, liquidity will be constrained in the bond
market but not in the CDS market.20 Taking a short position in a particular
credit through the bond market involves selling the bond short and borrowing
it in the repo market. Especially in Europe, liquidity in the repo market is
unpredictable because a signicant proportion of bond holders are restricted in
their lending of securities. In cases where a company's creditworthiness quickly
deteriorates, such as Xerox and Pacic Gas and Electric in 2000 and 2001, Rule
[2001] has documented that the CDS market is more liquid than the bond mar-
ket. An increasing number of market participants agree with these observations.
While only 10 market participants provided ve{year CDS prices on roughly 100
names in 2000, more than 30 banks and brokers now act as market makers on
over 300 global credits. The top ten counterparties at times cover as many as
700 credits each.
Although liquidity for CDS can be low at times, it seems that the CDS market
has turned into a highly accurate measure of credit quality. Credit Magazine
[2004] claims that some market participants refer to the market as an additional
rating agency. CDS prices for the Swiss employment agency Adecco, e. g., were
rising for months before S&P downgraded the company to speculative grade in
April 2004. The Bank for International Settlements [2004] explores the relation-
ship between ratings downgrades and CDS spreads in a special analysis. The
results appear to conrm that CDS spreads increasingly indicate future ratings
actions and tend to widen well in advance of the announcement of a downgrade.
In addition, Credit Magazine [2004] argue that the introduction of a CDS index
20Still, the reference securities are necessary for physical settlement following a credit event.
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and the widespread use of automated trading platforms has increased liquidity
almost to the level of treasury bonds.
In spite of the numerous advantages of investing in a CDS, there are a number
of risk factors that may aect protection buyers or sellers. While CDS with a
5-year maturity are quite liquid, there is no active market for o-the-run matu-
rities. In particular, instruments with a remaining time to maturity of between
4 and 5 years trade at a signicant premium. Even though protection sellers
mostly enjoy a very high rating, this does not mean that they cannot default.
Tavakoli [2001] reports that central banks at times issue CDS on bonds issued
by their central government, which implies a perfect default correlation of the
bond and the CDS. Nevertheless, the CDS trades at a positive premium. Con-
tagion is a vital element of almost all CDS because of the high degree of market
concentration. It is therefore nearly impossible to obtain protection with the
optimal default correlation of  1. And in spite of the higher degree of stan-
dardization since the 2003 ISDA denitions, there is still a considerable risk of
legal disputes when the quality of the reference entity deteriorates.
To conclude this section, we give a short introduction to the relationship be-
tween CDS and bonds.
In theory, bond CDS spreads or premium payments should be closely related to
bond yield spreads in excess of risk-free rates. To see this, consider a portfolio A
composed of a short position in the CDS on a corporate bond with notional $100
and a long position in a risk-free bond with the same notional and a portfolio
B with a long position in the corporate bond on which the CDS is written. If
no credit event occurs, the payo at maturity of portfolio A and B equals $100.
In the event of a credit event, portfolio B has a payo equal to the recovery
rate R times $100. Portfolio A, on the other hand, pays $100 minus the protec-
tion payment (1-R) times $100, which also adds up to R times $100. Since the
two portfolios have the same risk prole and identical payo structures, they
should also have the same initial price. Accordingly, the CDS and corporate
bond should trade at the same spread level.
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If the spread dierential between the CDS and the bond, the basis, is not zero,
it enables investors to use a common strategy termed basis arbitrage. A spread
on the CDS which is higher than in the bond market is known as a positive
basis. The reverse market situation, with the CDS spread below the cash price
of the reference position, is known as negative basis, but is less common. In-
vestors who believe that the basis has widened or narrowed by too much can
express that view through the CDS market. Nevertheless, there are a number
of highly plausible reasons why market prices for CDS can be dierent from
credit spreads on corporate bonds. As already mentioned, a lack of liquidity
in the term repo market for corporate bonds can mean that CDS premia move
higher relative to credit spreads on bonds if demand for protection increases,
reecting the cost of taking a short position in the bond to arbitrage between
the two markets. The cheapest-to-deliver option described above could also
require CDS premia to be higher. Protection sellers for CDS may require an
additional premium since they have no contractual rights such as information
requirements. Some market participants may prefer to take credit risk through
an unfunded instrument such as a CDS instead of purchasing a bond. This may
increase the supply of default protection and thus reduce CDS premia relative
to bond spreads. Dierent tax rates may also have a discriminating impact on
CDS and bond spreads.
3.3 Literature Review
The growth in literature on credit derivatives and CDS in particular has kept
up with the development of the market. In this section, we provide an overview
of selected theoretical and empirical studies of bond yield spreads, CDS prices
and the basis.
Theoretical work in the area commences with Longsta and Schwartz [1995] who
present a model for pricing credit spread options based on credit spreads that
follow an exogenous mean-reverting process. Das [1995] prices credit derivatives
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within a structural-form compound option model framework with stochastic in-
terest rates. Reduced-form models are developed by Duee [1999], who gives
a simple argumentation for the replication of CDS, Hull and White [2000] and
Hull and White [2001] who allow for correlated defaults and Houweling and
Vorst [2003] who implement a Due-Singleton type of model for CDS quotes.
They show that the equality between CDS premia and bond spreads only holds
approximately in the market and that this approximation results in a large de-
viation between theoretical and market CDS premia. For the empirical part of
their study the authors estimate risk-neutral processes for default-free interest
rates, hazard rates, and recovery rates, and nd that using the government curve
as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate systematically overestimates credit risk,
using the swap curve results in a small but statistically signicant bias, and
that only the repo curve yields unbiased estimates. To extract both hazard and
recovery rates from bond prices, they keep the recovery rate xed and scale
the hazard function accordingly. Overall, Houweling and Vorst [2003] nd that
the reduced-form model outperforms the direct comparison of CDS premia and
bond spreads, but that the premia generated by the model still deviate by 20%
to 50% from the observed market premia in an out-of-sample test.
In a similar model framework, Longsta et al. [2005] develop closed-form ex-
pressions for corporate bond prices and CDS premia in order to study the com-
ponents of bond yield spreads using information extracted from CDS. For this
purpose, they discount bond cash ows at an adjusted rate incorporating a liq-
uidity process, and thus attempt to capture the liquidity component in bond
prices. The risk-free interest rate and the hazard rate are computed from CDS
premia. To test robustness, the authors alternately take government rates, repo
rates and swap curves as specications of the riskless rate, and nd a signicant
non-default component in corporate spreads for each of them. This non-default
component is strongly related to measures of bond-specic illiquidity, measures
of Treasury richness and measures of overall liquidity in the xed-income mar-
kets.
Empirical studies on the properties of bond spreads, CDS premia and the basis
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are scarce. Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001] use a time-series of bond price quotes
to analyze the impact of nancial variables suggested by traditional default-risk
models such as the spot rate, the slope of the yield curve, leverage, volatility and
the business climate on bond yield spreads. They nd that these factors only
explain one quarter of the variation and that the residuals are highly correlated.
This is attributed to the presence of a large systematic component which the
authors are unable to determine from a variety of structural-form variables such
as liquidity, rm value and economic state variables. Firm specic factors in
particular seem to aect bond yield spreads more than the aggregate measures
common to all corporate bonds.
Aunon-Nerin et al. [2002] explore the explanatory power of factors implied by
structural-form models such as ratings, market value leverage, local interest
rates, the variance of stock prices etc. for CDS premia. In contrast to the re-
sults of Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001] for bonds, they nd that all these variables
have a signicant impact on CDS premia while liquidity measured as market
capitalization does not seem to matter. By tting a reduced-form model and
subsequently analyzing the model errors, the authors claim that equity market
information such as stock price change and volatility can explain up to 50% of
these errors.
Extending the work of Houweling and Vorst [2003], Blanco et al. [2005] investi-
gate the validity of the theoretical relationship between CDS premia and bond
credit spreads and determinants of changes of these measures of credit risk. For
their sample of CDS quotes and bond yields, they nd that the approximate
equality holds only when the risk-free rate is proxied by the swap rate and argue
that the credit spread and the CDS premium form a lower and upper boundary
for the true price of credit risk, respectively. The results for the factors aect-
ing credit spreads and CDS premia are in line with earlier studies. Variables
suggested by structural-form models explain a quarter of the variation in CDS
premia and are worse for credit spreads. The impact of stock returns and im-
plied volatilities is larger and more signicant for CDS premia. On the other
hand, price discovery seems to take place primarily in the CDS market, resulting
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in the same price for credit risk in both markets in the long run.
This aspect is further explored by Norden and Weber [2004]. Their analysis of a
time-series of stock, bond and CDS market data indicates that stock returns are
negatively associated with CDS and bond spread changes for the same company,
and that the stock market leads both of the other markets. In a pairwise com-
parison, the authors document a more pronounced relationship between CDS
and stock markets than between bond and stock markets. CDS spread changes,
in turn, lead bond spread changes in most cases and signicantly contribute to
price discovery. The strength of these lead-lag relationships seems to be aected
by the average credit rating of the rm but not by its size.
Schueler and Galletto [2003] explore the time-series behavior and determinants
of the basis. For the time interval from September 2001 to March 2003, they are
able to demonstrate a clear co-movement of the average basis with the perfor-
mance of the credit markets measured as the JPMorgan's aggregate index euro.
Plotting the average basis across the ratings spectrum, they obtain a basis smile
which agrees with the intuition that high-quality bonds often trade sub-Libor
whereas CDS premia must be positive, while speculative grade debt trades at
a large positive basis because of repo market restrictions and because the CTD
option is more valuable for CDS on low-rated reference entities. In addition,
they argue that dierences in the investor base for bonds and CDS, demand and
supply conditions, and bond characteristics such as convertibility and coupon
step-up or step-down features, have an impact on the basis.
Summarizing the results of these studies, there is broad agreement that structural-
form models can only capture a fraction of actual credit risk through variables
such as leverage, the rm value and interest rates. Equity-specic factors such
as changes in the stock price, the stock return and implied volatility have addi-
tional explanatory power for both bond spreads and CDS. On the other hand,
results for the impact of liquidity are mixed. Liquidity seems to be a central
issue at least for the bond market, and thus for the basis, while CDS are less
aected, a result that is in line with the intuition that CDS positions can either
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be neutralized through resale in the secondary market or through taking the
reverse position in an otherwise identical contract.
3.4 Data
In this section, we describe our data set for the CDS, the bonds and the vari-
ables that are used in our analyses.
3.4.1 CDS Data
The data source for the credit default swaps is the CreditTrade database. Cred-
itTrade, a London-based company, is one of the largest providers of online infor-
mation on credit derivatives. For the period from January 2001 to April 2004,
we obtain daily bid and ask quotes for 333 issuers. Since we have no transaction
prices available, we compute the mid quote as a proxy. At the issuer level, the
database contains the issuer name, industry, country and region according to
CreditTrade classication, as well as the issuer rating for senior debt. At the
issue level, it includes the rank of the debt deliverable under the CDS contract,
the time to maturity, the currency and notional amount of the default protec-
tion, the credit type and information on the restructuring option. Some 59%
of all observations are for issuers from the corporate sector, 21% for banks and
20% for sovereigns. We see that the fraction of CDS on corporate debt including
banks relative to the sovereign sector is higher than the proportion of corporate
to sovereign debt. This illustrates that debt issues which are nearly default-
free, such as U.S. Treasury notes, are less popular as reference entities in the
CDS market. Investors have little incentive to hold them as default insurance,
and the stable credit quality makes them less attractive for speculative purposes.
Among the 23 industry groups contained in the database, the nancial industry
makes up for 23% of all observations. The next groups, telecommunications and
manufacturing, only make up about 11% and 9%, respectively. The remaining
sectors all lie between 0.4% and 5%. The high number of CDS for the telecom-
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munications sector may partly be due to higher risk perception caused by the
spectacular WorldCom default.
At the issue level, we nd that the time to maturity ranges from 1 year to 10
years, but at 77%, 5 years to maturity is most common by far, followed by 10
and 3 years at 7% each. This agrees with most earlier studies. The currency
of the underlying issue is either U.S.$ (55%), Euro (39%) or Yen (6%). It is
interesting to note that $-denominated issues are most prevalent, even though
North America accounts for only a quarter of all reference entities. We see this
as an indication that most reference entities from the emerging markets and
about half of the Japanese reference entities are destined for the international
market, and therefore denominated in U.S.$.
The notional amount of the CDS equals 5 million for 34% of all observations,
10 million for 60% and 1 billion for 6%. The higher notional of 1 billion may
be less in demand because few protection buyers need to insure an equivalent
exposure. The amount is also too large for speculators, who may have to phys-
ically deliver the bond in the case of default through constrictions in the repo
market. In addition, only few protection sellers may be willing to take on such
a large amount of credit risk and the price will thus be disproportionately high.
For 94% of all observations, only senior debt is deliverable under the CDS con-
tract, the other observations allow for delivery of subordinate debt. This reects
the preference of most market participants for standardized contracts. About
54% of the observations concern CDS that incorporate the pre-1999 denition of
restructuring, see section 3.2.2. Some 36% already use the modied restructur-
ing option, and 10% allow for modied modied restructuring. It is remarkable
that even for a time-series running from 2001 to 2004, such a high proportion of
contracts contain current ISDA specications. We believe that this illustrates
how necessary consistent treatment of restructuring is for the future develop-
ment of the CDS market.
From the entire CDS data sample, we rst exclude all time series for which there
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are not enough changes. Our selection criterion is a minimum of 15 changes on
a weekly basis per half year. In addition, we only choose CDS with 5 years to
maturity since we have no consistent way to treat CDS with dierent times to
maturity. These two criteria decrease our sample by approximately 25%.
3.4.2 Bond Data
We collect data for the bond market from the Bloomberg online system. For
each of the remaining CDS, we rst determine the ticker of the issuer as denoted
in the CreditTrade database. All bonds listed under this ticker are then chosen
as potential reference bonds.21 First, all bonds with embedded options such
as convertibility, step-up or step-down coupon features and put/call features
are excluded from the sample since we have no consistent way to price these
options for dierent issuers and times to maturity. As bonds paying oating
rate coupons are subject to interest rate risk while CDS specify a regular xed
payment, we only choose bonds with xed coupon rates. In order to avoid ex-
change rate issues, we also discard bonds denominated in currencies other than
U.S.$ and Euro. Except for these criteria, a priori we accept all senior unsecured
bonds and debentures with maturity between 2001 and 2015, including those
that were classied as non-outstanding during the time of our analysis. Since
this sample does not necessarily include a bond that exactly matches the ve
years of maturity of the corresponding CDS, we choose one bond with less and
one bond with more than ve years to maturity during the life of the CDS. We
then use linear interpolation to obtain an appropriate synthetic ve-year bond.
In order to keep the error as small as possible, we also limit the dierence be-
tween the maturities of the two bonds to ve years.
We calculate two proxies for the bond yield spread. First, we determine the
dierence between the synthetic ve-year bond yield and the ve-year treasury
rate. For European entities, the yield to maturity of the Bundesobligation22
21At times, this ticker applies to more than one company. In this case, we include all bonds
identied by this ticker in our search. Altria Group, Inc., e. g., is a subsidiary of Philip Morris
Cos., Inc. and all Altria bonds are listed under the "MO" ticker.
22The Bundesobligation is a debt security issued by the federal government of Germany
with xed coupon payments and a ve-year term to maturity. It is deemed to be the default
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is used while we choose the ve-year U.S. Treasury rate for American issues.
Secondly, we compute the dierence between the synthetic bond yield and the
interest swap rate. This allows us to compare whether, as Houweling and Vorst
[2003] nd, the interest rate swap rate is a better proxy for the risk-free inter-
est rate than the treasury rate because of a liquidity premium the latter may
contain. Hence, we also use an interest rate swap of ve-year tenor.
Subtracting our proxies for the risk-free rate from the corporate bond yield, we
obtain credit spreads with respect to both the government rate and the swap
rate. Therefore, we also are able to compare the behavior of the basis with
regard to the two proxies of the risk-free rate.
3.4.3 Equity Data
Equity market data is in two parts: equity market index data and individual
equity data, all acquired from the Bloomberg service. For the European ref-
erence entities, the benchmark market index is the Dow Jones Stoxx 50. This
index provides a blue-chip representation of sector leaders in 17 European coun-
tries. It captures approximately 60% of the free-oat market capitalization of
the Dow Jones Stoxx Total Market Index, which in turn covers approximately
95% of the free-oat market capitalization of the countries represented. For
the American reference entities, we use the S&P 500 index as the benchmark
market index. The returns from the two market indices are used as the proxies
of the state variables of the whole economy. The individual equity returns are
taken as proxies of the health of the individual companies.
Changes in the volatility directly aect the future expected default probabilities
of the individual reference companies. To model this eect, we use the implied
volatilities from traded call options. We also incorporate the call-option implied
volatilities of the benchmark market indices, to capture changes in the average
expected default probabilities for the whole economy.
risk-free and eligible for use as a collateral.
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3.5 Descriptive Data Analysis
Before we determine the impact of the explanatory on CDS prices, bond spreads
and the basis, we give a basic overview over the time{series that remain from
our initial sample.
3.5.1 CDS Time Series
Most empirical studies nd that the rating of the issuer of the underlying debt
has a signicant impact on the CDS premium. We therefore present the prop-
erties of our reference set in Table 3.2 by rating.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of CDS by Rating
Mean, median, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the mean of CDS bid and
oer quotes, grouped by the S&P rating. The rst{to{last column gives the number
of observations that obtained the rating, the last column the number of reference
entities with the rating class.
S&P RATING Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Ref. Ent.
AAA 50.42 20.54 204 2
AA 39.75 27.78 1240 22
A 69.20 54.12 3407 63
BBB 152.22 116.71 1490 38
BB 544.02 293.80 425 10
B 1155.43 843.28 205 5
For the AAA rating level, we have two reference entities for which both mean
and median CDS are higher than the for the AA rated issues. We believe that
this is partly due to the fact that the time series for both AAA rated issues only
begin in late 2001, when CDS prices were generally lower than in the following
years. For all other rating levels, the mean and median increase as the credit
rating deteriorates. The standard deviation relative to the mean value is lowest
at 41% for the AAA rating class and highest at 78% for the A rating class. This
implies that there is a high variation in CDS that is not explained by default risk
alone, especially for the classes which contain a high number of observations. A
t-test reveals that the top four ratings classes from AAA to BBB do not have
signicantly dierent means at the 90% signicance level. The same is true for
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the lower two rating classes and those for which no rating was available. This
supports the notion that CDS are signicantly lower for investment grade debt
than for non-investment grade. We also nd that most CDS are written on
securities that have a rating between AA and BBB, an indication that investors
may combine less highly rated investment grade debt with a CDS contract as
default insurance. In addition, the high relative volatility of the CDS in these
classes may indicate that either the risk perception or the risk aversion of the
investors have changed over time.
Overall, we nd that there is substantial volatility in mid CDS quotes on the
ratings level. As expected, we nd that the mean CDS is increasing as the credit
rating deteriorates.
3.5.2 Credit Spread Time Series
For the CDS time series, we rst present the properties of the credit spreads of
the risky bond that was used to compute the credit spread, by rating.
From Table 3.3, we observe that the credit spread widens as the rating deterio-
rates. As expected, the total spread levels with respect to swap rates are about
30 basis points lower than those with respect to the government rate since swap
rates are determined on Libor, which in turn supposedly contains a credit risk
premium. However, the mean value of the credit spreads with respect to the
government rate of the AAA class is greater than that of the AA class. At rst
sight, this contradicts the fact that an AAA rating signies better credit quality.
However, we note that all of the 204 observations within the AAA class take
place between November 2001 and December 2003, while the 1240 observations
for the AA class are spread over the entire period from January 2001 to Decem-
ber 2004. Such an unbalanced panel may well shift the mean credit spread of
the higher ratings class upwards.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Credit Spread by Rating
Mean, standard deviation, number of observations and reference entities of credit
spread, grouped by the S&P rating.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics Using the Swap Rate
S&P RATING Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Ref. Ent.
AAA 25.81 6.24 204 2
AA 27.04 16.87 1240 22
A 60.84 35.09 3407 63
BBB 127.34 73.65 1490 38
BB 397.81 42.52 425 10
B 828.81 10.87 205 5
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Using the Government Rate
S&P RATING Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Ref. Ent.
AAA 70.52 6.24 204 2
AA 61.61 22.58 1240 22
A 99.80 38.35 3407 63
BBB 160.52 76.89 1490 38
BB 442.92 42.4 425 10
B 877.91 10.87 205 5
3.5.3 Basis Time Series
We then compute the basis as the dierence between the CDS price and the
credit spread using both swap and government rates. The descriptive statistics
are reported in Table 3.4.
We see that the mean value of the basis with respect to the swap rate is higher
than that with respect to the government rate for every ratings class. The
spreads between the two dierent measures of the basis range between 35 and
50 basis points. In addition, an eect known as the basis smile can be inferred
from Table 3.4: the basis decreases while the rating deteriorates from AAA to
A and subsequently increases. In their study on basis behavior, Schueler and
Galletto [2003] also observe a basis smile. They argue that the higher basis for
AAA and AA rated reference entities is caused by the necessity for a positive
CDS premium, while credit spreads for such issues can also be negative for the
swap rate. For sub-investment grade debt, the basis may widen because of repo
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Basis by Rating
Mean, standard deviation, number of observations and reference entities of the basis,
grouped by the S&P rating.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics Using the Swap Rate
S&P RATING Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Ref. Ent.
AAA 24.61 10.94 204 2
AA 12.71 13.19 1240 22
A 8.36 22.14 3407 63
BBB 24.88 37.76 1490 38
BB 146.22 19.47 425 10
B 326.61 2.07 205 5
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Using the Government Rate
S&P RATING Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Ref. Ent.
AAA -20.10 10.94 204 2
AA -21.86 17.28 1240 22
A -30.60 25.24 3407 63
BBB -8.30 39.09 1490 38
BB 101.11 20.02 425 10
B 277.52 2.07 205 5
market constraints increasing CDS prices, or through the higher value of the
cheapest-to-deliver option for CDS when the underlying bond has a higher de-
fault probability.
3.5.4 Econometric Time{Series Properties
Any regression using non-stationary exogenous and endogenous variables will
only give spurious results. Before we progress further, we check the time-series
properties for both the level and the rst dierence of the CDS, the credit spread
and the basis with regard to stationarity.
Unit Root Test
To determine whether the underlying data generating processes of the time se-
ries we observe have a unit root, we apply an augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The
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analysis is based on a weekly basis, which suggests that it should be sucient to
include one lag in order to capture any higher order autocorrelation. In the rst
step, we discard all time series with fewer than 25 observations on the weekly
level, which reduces our data set to 73 time series.
Table 3.5: Unit Root Test for CDS, Credit Spread and Basis
Panel A and Panel B report the results of the augmented Dickey{Fuller tests. The test
is based on weekly data. The null hypothesis is that the underlying data generating
process has a unit root. The column headings 1%, 5% and 10% suggest we can
reject the null hypothesis at these levels, respectively. 'Above' suggests that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected at 10% level.
Panel A: Unit Root Test with Swap Rate as Risk-free Rate
1% 5% 10% Above
CDS 2 3 2 66
Credit Spread 4 1 4 64
Basis 16 9 6 42
Panel B: Unit Root Test with Government Rate as Risk-free Rate
1% 5% 10% Above
CDS 2 3 2 66
Credit Spread 3 1 2 65
Basis 10 4 7 34
Table 3.5 shows the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Taking 5%
as the threshold, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the underlying data
generating process contains a unit root for 68 out 73 time series for the CDS
data. When using the swap rate as the risk-free rate with the same threshold
value, 69 out of 73 time series of credit spreads are non-stationary, and 67 out
of 73 time series of credit spreads are non-stationary when the series of gov-
ernment rates is used. Overall, more than 90% of the individual credit default
swap price and credit spread time series seem to be non-stationary. Before dis-
cussing the results for the basis, as dened as the dierence between the credit
default swap price and the credit spread, we note that its stationarity would
imply that the credit default swap price and the credit spread are cointegrated
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with a cointegrating vector of [1; 1]. From the last rows of panel A and B,
however, the null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected in only 25 and 14 basis
time series at the 5% level with respect to the swap rate and the government
rate; the majority are non-stationary. To determine whether this suggests a
restricted cointegration, we conduct an explicit cointegration test of the credit
default swap price and credit spread in the next section.
To determine the order of integration of the time series, we repeat the station-
arity test on the rst dierences of the time series. As before, we use one-lag
for possible higher order autocorrelation.
Table 3.6: Unit Root Test for First Dierence of CDS, Credit Spread and Basis
Panel A and Panel B report the results of the augmented Dickey{Fuller tests on
the rst dierences of the time series. The test is based on weekly data. The null
hypothesis is that the underlying data generating process has a unit root. The column
headings 1%, 5% and 10% suggest we can reject the null hypothesis at these levels,
respectively. 'Above' suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 10%
level.
Panel A: Unit Root Test with Swap Rate as Risk-free Rate
1% 5% 10% Above
CDS 73 0 0 0
Credit Spread 73 0 0 0
Basis 72 0 1 0
Panel B: Unit Root Test with Government Rate as Risk-free Rate
1% 5% 10% Above
CDS 73 0 0 0
Credit Spread 73 0 0 0
Basis 71 2 0 0
Table 3.6 presents our results. Almost all time series are stationary at the 1%
level on the rst dierences, with only two basis time series stationary at the
5% level and one at the 10% level. This allows us to conclude that the credit
default swap price and credit spread are integrated of order one. Recall from
Table 3.5 that 34% and 19% of the basis time series were already stationary at
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this level; the rest are integrated of order one. In the next section, we try to
determine further characteristics of the cointegration relationship between the
CDS and the credit spread time series.
Cointegration Test
To explore the relationship between the CDS and the credit spread time se-
ries, we employ the Johansen cointegration test. The trace statistics are used
to judge whether the two time series are cointegrated. Both two-lags and the
constant term are included in the test.
Table 3.7: Johansen Cointegration Test
The table reports the results of the Johansen cointegration test with the CDS pre-
mium and the credit spread. The number of the cointegrating vectors are reported.
Panel A shows the results using the swap rate as the risk-free rate and Panel B
presents the results using the government rate as the risk-free rate.
Panel A: Johansen Cointegration Test with Swap Rate as Risk-free Rate
Cointegrating Vectors Number
0 40
1 26
2 7
Panel B: Johansen Cointegration Test with Government Rate as Risk-free Rate
Cointegrating Vectors Number
0 45
1 21
2 7
Table 3.7 summarizes our results. 40 and 45 tests reject the hypothesis that the
CDS prices and the credit spreads are cointegrated with respect to the swap
rate (the government rate). 26 and 21 tests suggest that there is one cointe-
grating vector for the two time series. Two cointegrating vectors are suggested
by 7 tests for both rates. Comparing these results with the unit root tests in
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the previous section, 25 and 14 tests reject the null hypothesis of having a unit
root. Thus, an additional 8 and 14 series are stationary when the restriction of
the [1, -1] cointegrating vector is not imposed.
These results indicate that 33 and 28 pairs of CDS and credit spread time series
have a long-run relationship. Hence, to use the vector error correction model to
analyze the relationship between the CDS premia and the credit spread is not
applicable to all the single names.
3.6 Fixed Eects Estimation
3.6.1 The Eect of Individual Firm Properties
As an alternative to the vector error correction model, we analyze the relation-
ship between the exogenous variables and the basis using xed eects models.
The intuition of using the xed eect model is that the mean of the basis varies
signicantly with respect to dierent rating classes. Table 3.8 shows that the
mean of the rating class AA is around the mean of the whole sample, while
those of the A and BBB rating classes are nearly 50% and 200% that of the
whole sample, respectively. As we expected, the standard deviation increases
fast when the credit quality deteriorates. All these suggest there is an unob-
served factor in the level of the basis which is related to the credit quality.
Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics of Basis by Combined Rating Class
The table shows the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum and the
number of the observations of the basis by rating class. The numbers are reported in basis
point.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Whole Sample 15.40 41.36 -154.68 481.24 5072
AA 12.57 17.66 -34.23 144.60 904
A 8.55 25.05 -148.57 249.87 2706
BBB 21.00 49.73 -154.68 286.94 1145
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Fixed eect models are often used to explore the impact of a time-invariant,
unobserved eect on the dependent variable that is itself unobservable but cor-
related with the regressors. As we have already seen that basis levels vary
strongly within dierent ratings classes, we believe that the correlation assump-
tion will hold. Because of the correlation between basis and credit quality, we
adopt the xed eect model rather than the random eect model23.
We therefore estimate the following model:
basisi;t = 1R
I
i;t + 2vol
I
i;t + 3liq
I
i;t + ci + i;t (3.1)
where basisi;t denotes the dierence between the CDS premium and the credit
spread on underlying i at time t. We maintain the assumption that the unob-
served eect ci is time-invariant within the sub-sample and correlated with the
exogenous variables.
RIi;t and vol
I
i;t are the weekly return of the individual equity, the call-option
implied volatility of the individual equity which proxies the business climate
and the business risk of the underlying entity, respectively. liq is the proxy for
the liquidity of the credit derivative market, which is dened as the relative
bid-ask spread. In order to avoid the endogeneity problem, we take the spread
on Tuesdays.24 ci denotes the unobserved eect that is time-invariant for each
individual underlying entity i.
Since we nd that both credit derivatives and bond markets exhibit signicantly
dierent behavior before and after mid 2002, we subdivide our sample into two
time intervals from January 2001 to September 2002 and from October 2002 to
December 2003 in order to ensure time-invariance. The specic date of Septem-
23The random eect model is more ecient than the xed eect model. However, the
random eect model generates inconsistent estimators when the unobserved, time-invariant
factor is correlated with any of the exogenous variables. In our case, credit quality is likely to
be correlated with the individual equity return, call-option implied volatility and the liquidity
proxy. Therefore, we prefer the xed eect model to the random eect model.
24The basis is the dierence between the CDS premium and the credit spread. There-
fore, using the relative spread on Thursdays is not appropriate for the estimation, so we use
the relative bid-ask spread, (ask-bid)/mid CDS, on Tuesdays as the instrument variable for
liquidity.
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ber 30th is picked for a number of reasons. First, any attempt to separate the
total sample at an earlier date would still result in an unbalanced number of
observations before (1866 observations) and after (3206 observations) this date.
Secondly, separating at a later point in time, on the other hand, would make
the results of any estimation which uses time-sensitive data, such as equity, less
indicative of the actual dependencies. We therefore chose a date when specula-
tion about the possibility of the second Gulf war reaching a crescendo and large
investor groups from the Gulf region started transferring property from the US
to other countries. Meanwhile, the market had started to be concerned about
on the case of WorldCom. Both left the credit derivative and bond markets
more volatile. To avoid the impact of outliers, we also delete all time series for
which we have less than 26 observations. The remaining number of entities is
then 57.
The stock return is stationary process. The volatility and liquidity proxy are
not stationary, but they are mean reverting processes, which implies that the
second moment cannot be innite.
Before estimating the model, we check the correlation between the exogenous
variables. Table 3.9 presents the correlation coecients of the endogenous and
exogenous variables. We nd that it is low, as the highest correlation is less
than 35%.
Table 3.9: Correlation of Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
The table reports the correlation between the basis, the individual equity return, the call-
option implied volatility, the liquidity proxy, the long-term interest rate and the slope of the
interest rate curve.
Basis(Swap) Equity Individual Liquidity Long-term Slope of
Return Volatility Proxy Interest Rate Interest Rate
Basis(Swap) 1
Individual Equity Return -0.044 1
Individual Volatility 0.175 -0.183 1
Liquidity Proxy -0.168 0.032 -0.260 1
Long-term Interest Rate 0.010 -0.077 -0.230 0.086 1
Slope of Interest Rate -0.046 0.122 -0.347 0.303 -0.227 1
From economic theory, since the CDS and the bond have the same reference en-
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tity, the individual equity return, which proxies for the total value and business
climate, should have the same impact on these two instruments, and the basis,
dened as the CDS premium minus the credit spread, should be indierent to
change in individual equity return. We form the rst hypothesis:
H1: The basis does not change when the rm value and the business
climate change.
Although CDS and bond have the same reference entity and thus have the same
proxy for the business risk, call-option implied volatility, we would expect that
they react dierently when the call-option implied volatility changes. Since the
credit derivative market has higher liquidity than the bond market and the cap-
ital needed to change the risk exposure in the credit derivative market is lower
than that in the bond market, investors will prefer to adjust risk exposure in the
derivative market, which makes the CDS premium more sensitive to a change
in the business risk. Hence, the second hypothesis is formed:
H2: Investors prefer to adjust credit risk exposure in the credit
derivative market, i.e., the basis is positively correlated to call-option
implied volatility.
The liquidity also plays an important role in determining the level of the basis.
When the liquidity of credit derivative market improves, the CDS premium will
drop. Therefore, we form the third hypothesis:
H3: If the liquidity of the credit derivative market worsens, the basis
will increase because of the positive liquidity premium in the credit
derivative market.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.10. We nd that the coecients
on the individual equity return of all three samples are insignicant, while those
on the individual volatility of all three samples are positive and signicant. The
numeric values do not dier substantially. We infer that the impact of the in-
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Table 3.10: Fixed Eects Estimation of Basis (Swap)
The table presents the coecient estimates for the whole sample and the two sub{samples.
The rst column reports the result of the whole sample; the next two columns report the
results of the two sub{samples. The last three rows give the the number of observations,
number of reference entities and the goodness-of-t in each sample.
The Whole Period Before Sept 30 2002 After Sept 30 2002
Individual Equity Return -0.143 -0.275 0.181
-0.132 -0.16 -0.182
Individual Volatility 0.724 0.725 0.78
(0.053)** (0.076)** (0.066)**
Liquidity Proxy -19.995 -111.407 12.102
(6.083)** (10.003)** -7.944
Observations 5072 1866 3206
Number of Ref. Entities 57 48 57
R-squared 0.05 0.12 0.04
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
dividual volatility does not vary much in the two sub-samples. The coecients
on the liquidity proxy of the whole sample and the earlier period sample are
negative and signicant, but that of the latter period sample is not signicant.
The numeric value of the coecient with the earlier period sample is more than
ve times that of the whole sample, which is due to the insignicant coecient
in the latter period sample. Hence, we conclude that the Hypothesis 1 and 2
cannot be rejected, whilst Hypothesis 3 is rejected.
The possible reason for the rejection of Hypothesis 3 comes from the fact that
the market behaves dierently in the two sub-periods. In the earlier period,
when the liquidity worsens, the bond market is more aected than the credit
derivative market. Hence we observe negative and signicant coecients. In
the later period, the inuence of the liquidity on the credit derivative market
and the bond market is virtually identical and they oset each other, and the
liquidity no longer plays a signicant role in determining the level of the basis.
In January 2005, Simon Boughey pointed out in Riskwater.com:"In fact, the
structure and pattern of the CDS market in those days militated against the
successful development of an online platform. Liquidity, though growing rapidly,
was much less than it is today. Moreover, liquidity tended to be spasmodic and
concentrated in specic sectors ...". According to this, we would argue, liquidity
in both markets had improved in the later period.
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To check the robustness of the above ndings, we repeat the xed eect esti-
mation in Equation 3.1 for individual rating classes. We combine AA+, AA
and AA- S&P rating into an AA rating class in our regression. Using the same
procedure, we form the A and BBB rating class. These three rating classes
have 904, 2,706 and 1,145 observations in the whole sample, respectively, which
counts for 94% of all observations.
Table 3.11 reports the output from the xed eect estimation by rating class.
In the table, Panel A summarizes the result of xed eect estimation of rating
class AA, Panel B illustrates that of rating class A, and Panel C illustrates
rating class BBB.
All the three panels again conrm the results in Table 3.10, except for the mi-
nor dierence that the individual equity return of rating class A is signicant
in the earlier period sample and the liquidity proxy of rating class BBB is in-
signicant in the whole sample. This comes from the fact that the number of
observations in the BBB rating class in the latter period sample outnumbers
that in the earlier period sample markedly. We also see that the coecients on
call-option implied volatilities increase as the rating deteriorates. In the whole
sample, when the call-option implied volatility rises 1%, the basis climbs 0.298,
0.469 and 0.886 basis point for the AA, A and BBB rating classes, respectively.
The basis of BBB rating class is almost three times more sensitive than that of
AA rating class, which is reasonable. The coecients on the liquidity proxy do
not have such pattern by rating classes. The R2 in the latter period are lower
than those in the earlier period, which is aected by the no-longer signicant
liquidity proxy in the model. The results are inline with our expectation and
conrm the nding that call-option implied volatility is the only signicant fac-
tor in the latter period. As the market matures, the liquidity proxy, which is
signicant in the early period, no longer plays an important role in pricing the
basis.
These ndings suggest that the past strategies of pricing basis should be ad-
justed due to the dierent behavior of the market in recent period.
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3.6.2 The Eect of Individual Firm and Interest Rate
Properties
The interest rate also has signicant inuence on the CDS premium and the
credit spread. In early works, Aunon-Nerin et al. [2002] and Blanco et al. [2005]
document that the long-term interest rate, proxied by the ten-year interest rate,
and the slope of the interest rate curve, which is dened as the dierence be-
tween the ten-year and two-year interest rate, have signicant impact on the
change of the CDS premium and the credit spread. The interest rate swap of
euro and US Dollar are used for European and American reference entities, re-
spectively. Here we use xed eect models to investigate whether these eects
have a signicant impact on the basis. Before we run the regression, we assume
that if both the credit derivative market and the bond market have the same
sensitivity to the change of the interest rate, then the coecients of these two
factors will not be statistically signicant. However, if they react dierently to
the change in the interest rate, we will be able to nd signicant, either positive
or negative, coecients. The fourth hypothesis is thus formed:
H4: The basis does not change when the long-term interest rate and
the slope of yield curve changes.
We therefore estimate the following model:
basisi;t = 1R
I
i;t + 2vol
I
i;t + 3liq
I
i;t ++4r
l
i;t + 5r
s
i;t + ci + i;t (3.2)
RIi;t and vol
I
i;t are the weekly return of the individual equity and the call-option
implied volatility of the individual equity, which proxy the business climate and
the business risk of the underlying entity, respectively. liq is the proxy for the
liquidity of the credit derivative market, which is dened as the relative bid-ask
spread. rli;t is the ten-year long-term interest rate. For European and American
entities, we use the interest rate swap of Euro and U.S. Dollar, respectively. rsi;t
is the slope of the interest rate curve, which is dened as the ten-year interest
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Table 3.11: Rating Class Break Down of Basis (Swap)
The table presents the xed eect estimation of the basis by dierent rating classes. The
rst column reports the estimation with the whole sample, the next two columns show the
estimation with the earlier period sample and the latter period sample, respectively. The
individual equity return, the call-option implied volatility and the liquidity proxy are included
as exogenous variables. The last three rows present the number of observations, the number
of reference entities and the goodness-of-t of each sample.
Panel A: Rating Class AA
Rating Class: AA The Whole Period Before Sept 30 2002 After Sept 30 2002
Individual Equity Return -0.273 -0.159 0.026
-0.167 -0.225 -0.164
Individual Volatility 0.298 0.227 0.44
(0.068)** (0.104)* (0.061)**
Liquidity Proxy -39.532 -128.42 6.463
(7.058)** (11.434)** -6.75
Observations 904 436 468
Number of Reference Entities 12 10 12
R-squared 0.08 0.26 0.1
Panel B: Rating Class A
Rating Class: A The Whole Period Before Sept 30 2002 After Sept 30 2002
Individual Equity Return -0.11 -0.311 -0.052
-0.136 (0.129)* -0.213
Individual Volatility 0.469 0.438 0.519
(0.058)** (0.066)** (0.080)**
Liquidity Proxy -21.683 -76.481 2.642
(6.522)** (8.938)** -9.447
Observations 2706 1121 1585
Number of Reference Entities 36 28 33
R-squared 0.03 0.11 0.03
Panel C: Rating Class BBB
Rating Class: BBB The Whole Period Before Sept 30 2002 After Sept 30 2002
Individual Equity Return -0.476 -1.34 0.73
-0.41 -0.863 -0.397
Individual Volatility 0.886 1.344 0.692
(0.150)** (0.334)** (0.144)**
Liquidity Proxy -31.889 -149.398 -34.915
-21.177 (73.998)* -19.18
Observations 1145 241 904
Number of Reference Entities 19 10 19
R-squared 0.04 0.11 0.04
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
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rate minus the two-year interest rate. We use the interest rate swap again to
be consistent with the calculation of the long-term interest rate. ci denotes the
unobserved eect that is time-invariant for each individual underlying entity i.
Table 3.12: Fixed Eect Estimation of Basis (Swap) with Interest Rate Variables
The table presents the coecient estimates for the whole sample and the two sub{samples.
The rst column reports the result of the whole sample; the next two columns report the
results of the two sub{samples. The last three rows give the the number of observations,
number of reference entities and the goodness-of-t in each sample.
The Whole Period Before Sept 30 2002 After Sept 30 2002
Individual Equity Return -0.169 -0.27 0.153
-0.13 -0.157 -0.178
Individual Volatility 0.909 1.066 1.018
(0.053)** (0.102)** (0.071)**
Liquidity Proxy -20.08 -98.249 1.755
(5.934)** (9.963)** -7.773
Long-term Interest Rate 12.415 12.509 9.219
(0.849)** (1.918)** (1.568)**
Slope of Interest Rate Curve 19.859 16.704 34.069
(1.347)** (1.558)** (3.554)**
Observations 5072 1866 3206
Number of Ref. Entities 57 48 57
R-squared 0.09 0.18 0.10
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
Table 3.12 presents the xed eect estimation with both rm-specic and inter-
est rate factors. The rst column shows the coecients for the whole sample,
and the next two columns report the coecients for the two sub-samples. We
nd that the coecients on rm-specic factors have the same sign and signif-
icance as those in Table 3.10. The coecients on individual equity return are
not signicant in all three samples. Contrarily, the coecients on call-option
implied volatility are positive and signicant in all three samples. The coe-
cient on liquidity proxy is again signicant in the earlier period but insignicant
in the latter period. The coecients on the interest rate factors are signicant
and positive, which implies that the credit derivative market is more sensitive
to the change of the interest rate factors than the bond market.
CDS is a derivative product, which is often traded higher when credit investors
are driven by volatile equity markets. Cash bond is relatively resilient due to
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its thin liquidity. As CDS is much more driven by the volatility, the coecient
on volatility is positive and signicant.
The sign of liquidity proxy is negative in the earlier period. If liquidity proxy,
(Ask CDS - Bid CDS)/Mid CDS, increases, liquidity condition in credit mar-
ket deteriorates, and the regression suggests that basis decreases. I.e., CDS
increases less than credit spread; or CDS decreases more than credit spread.
When economy and funding environment are in good shape, credit spread de-
creases more than CDS. The reason is that credit spread contains a liquidity
component, or liquidity plays a more important role in cash bond than it does
in CDS. If economy and funding environment improve, liquidity increases and
liquidity component in basis point also drops. So credit spread moves faster.
When economy and funding environment are in distress, credit spread increases
more than CDS does due to the liquidity component.
The results of interest rate related factors show that the Hypothesis 4 can be
rejected.
Although CDS and credit spread have the same reference entity, the basis is
still sensitive to the changes in the long-term interest rate and the slope of yield
curve. The R2 increases sharply when these two additional factors are added.
For the whole sample, it changes from 5% to 9%, and for the two sub-samples,
it changes from 12% and 4% to 18% and 10%, respectively.
It is obvious that the interest rate factors captures the additional variation of
the basis and this model performs better than the previous one. By inserting
interest rate factors, we are able to explain more about the basis than simply
by using the rm-specic factors. The results also reveal the fact that the two
markets react dierently to the change in interest rate factors, which is consis-
tent in both the whole sample and the two sub-samples.
In basis trade, an investor will borrow and lend in overnight market. In a neg-
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ative basis trade, an investor borrows money from the overnight market to buy
the bond. The change in basis thus depends on the liquidity in overnight money
market. The slope of interest rates is widely used as the signal of money mar-
ket liquidity. A steep curve shows there is sucient liquidity so that long-term
liabilities can be funded by short-term borrowing. Market participants will, in
this circumstance, be able to borrow in overnight market and trade basis, which
will in turn have impact on changes in basis. In this case, including interest
rate variables will increase the explanatory power.
Again, we check the robustness of the ndings by repeating the xed eect es-
timation for individual rating classes. As in the previous subsection, we form
AA, A and BBB rating classes by combining the original S&P ratings, which
accounts for 94% of all observations.
The results are shown in Table 3.13. Panel A shows the results of rating class
AA. The coecients on the individual equity return are all insignicant and
negative. These properties are the same as those without interest rate variables
of rating class AA and with interest rate variables of pooled rating classes. The
coecients on the individual volatility are all positive and signicant. The co-
ecient of the sample before Sept 30, 2002 is 0.354, which is lower than those
of the whole sample and latter sample at 0.433 and 0.45, respectively. The co-
ecient on the individual volatility of the earlier sample is signicant at the 1%
level, while those of the whole sample and latter sample are signicant at the
5% level. The higher impact of individual volatility in the latter sample is also
due to the higher CDS premia in the latter period. The numeric values of the
coecients of all three samples are higher than those of the estimation of rating
class AA without interest rate variables but lower than those with interest rate
variables of pooled rating classes.
The coecients on the liquidity proxy are signicant and negative in the whole
period and in the earlier period. However, it becomes insignicant in the latter
period. When the liquidity of the credit derivative market increases, the basis
decreases in both the whole sample and the earlier period sample. Nevertheless,
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Table 3.13: Rating Class Break Down of Basis (Swap) with Interest Rate Vari-
ables
The table presents the xed eect estimation of the basis by dierent rating classes. The
rst column reports the estimation with the whole sample, the next two columns show the
estimation with the earlier period sample and the latter period sample, respectively. The
individual equity return, the call-option implied volatility, the liquidity proxy, the long-term
interest rate and the slope of the interest rate curve are included as exogenous variables. The
last three rows present the number of observations, the number of reference entities and the
goodness-of-t of each sample.
Panel A: Rating Class: AA
Rating Class: AA The Whole Period Before Sept 30 2002 After Sept 30 2002
Individual Equity Return -0.294 -0.172 -0.112
-0.162 -0.224 -0.159
Individual Volatility 0.433 0.354 0.45
(0.068)** (0.140)* (0.065)**
Liquidity Proxy -43.629 -121.557 -2.139
(6.954)** (12.501)** -6.594
Long-term Interest Rate 10.508 4.813 10.193
(1.318)** -2.794 (1.723)**
Slope of Interest Rate Curve 12.701 7.332 15.643
(1.841)** (2.125)** (4.455)**
Observations 904 436 468
Number of Ref. Entities 12 10 12
R-squared 0.14 0.28 0.18
Panel B: Rating Class: A
Rating Class: A The Whole Period Before Sept 30 2002 After Sept 30 2002
Individual Equity Return -0.167 -0.343 -0.094
-0.132 (0.123)** -0.204
Individual Volatility 0.639 0.573 0.724
(0.058)** (0.087)** (0.084)**
Liquidity Proxy -20.313 -58.44 -4.773
(6.314)** (8.561)** -9.031
Long-term Interest Rate 10.148 7.053 11.769
(0.881)** (1.573)** (1.804)**
Slope of Interest Rate Curve 19.096 14.164 28.197
(1.306)** (1.212)** (4.021)**
Observations 2706 1121 1585
Number of Ref. Entities 36 28 33
R-squared 0.11 0.22 0.12
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
the liquidity proxy has no impact on the basis in the latter period sample. The
numeric value of the coecient of the earlier sample is almost three times of
that of the whole sample. The results are similar to those of the estimation
both without interest rate variables of rating class AA and with interest rate
variables of pooled rating classes.
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Panel C: Rating Class: BBB
Rating Class: BBB The Whole Period Before Sept 30 2002 After Sept 30 2002
Individual Equity Return -0.274 -1.312 0.716
-0.402 -0.852 -0.392
Individual Volatility 0.963 2.319 0.916
(0.150)** (0.503)** (0.157)**
Liquidity Proxy -24.01 -220.343 -43.654
-20.808 (73.539)** (19.073)*
Long-term Interest Rate 17.565 37.568 6.751
(2.492)** (10.109)** (3.359)*
Slope of Interest Rate Curve -2.808 52.458 34.4
-5.815 (23.982)* (7.522)**
Observations 1145 241 904
Number of Ref. Entities 19 10 19
R-squared 0.09 0.18 0.08
The coecients on the long-term interest rate are positive. The coecients in
the whole sample and the latter period sample are signicant, but that for the
earlier period sample is not. The numeric values of the coecients of the whole
sample and the latter sample are 10.508 and 10.193, respectively. Compared
with the coecients of the estimation with pooled rating classes, we nd that
the coecient of the earlier period sample is positive and signicant when the
sample has pooled rating classes. The coecients on the slope of interest rate
curve are all positive and signicant. The numerical value of the whole sample,
the earlier sample and the latter sample are 12.701, 7.332, and 15.643, respec-
tively. The impact is greater in the latter period, which is similar to the result
of the estimation with pooled rating classes.
Panel B presents the results of the estimation with rating class A. The coe-
cients on the individual equity return of the whole sample and the latter period
sample are insignicant, but that of the earlier sample is negative and signi-
cant. Contrarily, all coecients in the estimation with pooled rating classes are
not signicant. When compared with those without interest rate variables of
rating class A, we nd that the coecients of both with and without interest
rate variables in the earlier sample are signicant and negative. The numeric
values are also close to each other.
The coecients on the individual volatility of all three samples are positive
and signicant, which are similar to those of the samples both without interest
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rate variables of rating class A and with interest rate variables of pooled rating
classes. The numeric values are 0.639, 0.573 and 0.724, respectively. We nd
that the basis changes more in the latter period sample when the individual
volatility increases by 1%. This pattern is found in the results of the estimation
without interest rate variables of rating class A, but not in those with interest
rate variables of pooled rating classes.
The coecients on the liquidity proxy have comparable properties to those with-
out interest rate variables of rating class A and those with interest rate variables
of pooled rating classes. They are negative and signicant in the whole period
and in the earlier period. However, they become insignicant in the latter pe-
riod. The coecients on the long-term interest rate of all three samples are
positive and signicant, and comparable to those with interest rate variables of
pooled rating classes. The numeric value of the latter sample is greater than
that of the earlier sample. However, the relation is reversed when we look at
the results of the estimation with pooled rating classes. The coecients on the
slope of the interest rate curve of all three samples are positive and signicant
also. These ndings and the numerical values of the coecients have a similar
pattern to those of the estimations both with both interest rate variables of
rating class A and without interest rate variables of pooled rating classes.
Panel C shows the results of the estimation with rating class BBB. The coef-
cients on the individual equity return of all three samples are not signicant,
and identical to the results of the estimation both with interest rate variables
of pooled rating classes and without interest rate variables of rating class BBB.
The coecients on the individual volatility of all three samples are positive and
signicant. Again, they are identical to the results of the estimations both with
interest rate variables of pooled rating classes and without interest rate variables
of rating class BBB. Moreover, we nd that the numeric value of the estimation
in the earlier period sample is more than twice the size of that in the latter pe-
riod sample, at 2.319 and 0.916, respectively. This is consistent with the results
of the estimation without interest rate variables of rating class BBB. Compared
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with the coecients of 1.066 and 1.018 from the estimation with interest rate
variables of pooled rating classes, the dierence here is much more substantial.
The coecients on the liquidity proxy are negative and signicant for the esti-
mations with two sub-samples but not with the whole sample, which is likely to
be due to the fact that the impact of the liquidity proxy is signicantly dierent
in the two sub-samples, and thus leads to the high variance of the estimated
coecient with the whole sample. The numeric value of the coecient in the
earlier period sample is around ve times that in the latter period sample. When
we compare them with the results of the estimation with interest rate variables
of pooled rating classes, we nd that the liquidity proxy is signicant in the
whole sample with pooled rating classes but insignicant in the latter period
sample with pooled rating classes. When looking at the number of the observa-
tions, we notice that in the latter period sample it is about four times that in
the earlier period. This property of the sub-samples diers substantially from
those of estimations with interest rate variables of pooled rating classes. The
dierence comes from the very unbalanced sub-samples in rating class BBB.
Similar results are found in those of estimations without interest rate variables
of rating class BBB.
The coecients on the long-term interest rate of all three samples are positive
and signicant. When we crosscheck them with those of estimations with inter-
est rate variables of pooled rating classes, we nd that the dierence between
the earlier and the latter period samples is more signicant than that of the
estimation with interest rate variables of pooled rating classes. For the names
with BBB rating, the impact of the long-term interest rate in the earlier period
sample is about ve times greater than that in the latter period sample. The
coecients on the slope of the interest rate curve are positive and signicant in
the estimations of two sub-samples. Compared with the results of the estima-
tion with interest rate variables of pooled rating classes, where we nd positive
and signicant coecients in the whole sample, the coecient here is insigni-
cant for the estimation in the whole sample. This is also due to the unbalanced
number of observations of the rating class BBB, which are clustered in the latter
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period sample. The numeric value of the estimation in the earlier period sam-
ple is greater than that of the estimation in the latter period sample, which is
contrary to those of the estimation with interest rate variables of pooled rating
classes.
All in all, the xed eect estimation of the basis with samples of dierent rating
classes show that the liquidity proxy and the slope of the interest rate curve
have various impact on the basis, especially for the rating class BBB. These
phenomena are due to the unbalanced observations of the names with rating
class BBB. In the latter period sample, there are much greater observations.
On the other hand, the CDS premia and the basis of BBB rating class are rela-
tively high because of the worse credit quality and the thin market in the CDS
products. When the investor is determined to exploit the dierence between
CDS and credit spread of the same underlying entity, he has to seriously take
the rating class of the name he trades into account. The factors also have dif-
ferent impacts on the basis along with the maturation of the market. It is clear
that they behave substantially dierently in the earlier and the latter period
samples, especially the liquidity proxy. Hypothesis 4 can be rejected.
3.7 Conclusion
The discrepancy between the credit derivative and bond markets, which usually
reects either positive or negative basis, is determined by many factors. In this
paper, we examine the determinants of the basis using xed eect models to cap-
ture the time-variant mean of the basis and nd the properties of the basis. The
xed eect estimation allows us to capture the dierence in the constant terms,
which is apparently driven by the rating classes. The ndings of the determi-
nants of the basis are mixed. First, the CDS premium and the credit spread
are integrated of order 1 for most of the reference entities. The non-stationarity
property suggests that the usual regression cannot provide meaningful results.
Secondly, business climate and business risk are checked. We nd that the busi-
ness climate, proxied by the individual equity return, does not have a signicant
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impact on the basis. The business risk with the call-option implied volatility
as the proxy, however, is positive and signicant. The basis will rise when the
level of the business risk goes up, which hints that the credit derivative and the
bond markets behave dierently towards business risk. Thirdly, the liquidity of
the credit derivative market aects the change of the basis in the earlier period
sample but not the latter period sample. The liquidity of the credit derivative
market improved in the latter period sample and the eect of the liquidity proxy
is cancelled. Fourthly, the long-term interest rate and the slope of the interest
rate curve also drive the basis. When the long-term interest rate and the slope
of the interest rate curve increase, the basis rises.
After identifying the drivers of the basis, investors can analyze and compare the
credit risk of the same underlying in the credit derivative and bond markets.
Moreover, the prediction of the basis using the drivers enables investors to ben-
et from the dierence in the price of the credit risk in the credit derivative and
bond markets by buying the credit risk in one market and selling it in the other.
Chapter 4
The Relationship of
Systematic Credit Risks
4.1 Introduction
"The credit derivatives market has changed more than ever in the last six months,
in terms of the variables traded, and that is because of the merging of the two
indices."
Around a year after the inception of iTraxx indices, Andrew Palmer, global head
of credit derivatives market at JPMorgan in London, made the comments above
on the impact of the launch of iTraxx indices.
Since the inauguration of iTraxx indices, the transparency and liquidity in credit
markets have substantially improved. Many market participants have deemed
the iTraxx platform as representing market consensus on overall credit quality
and trade the iTraxx indices to express their view on credit markets. Thus, it is
of great interest to examine the relationship between the iTraxx index and the
iBoxx index, which is the benchmark index for the bond market.
Though it is already shown that the credit derivative market leads the bond
market for individual names, the relationship between the indices of credit mar-
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ket and bond market has not yet been investigated. Since credit investors have
been increasingly trading the iTraxx indices for improved liquidity, clarifying the
relation between the iTraxx and iBoxx indices will assist them to make decisions.
Literatures on the relationship between credit derivative and other markets are
now much more prevalent for individual names. Blanco et al. [2005] nd that
the credit derivative market leads the bond market for individual entities in the
price discovery process from 2001 to 2002. Norden and Weber [2004] show that
the CDS market plays a more important role for price discovery for individual
names than the corporate bond market from 2000 to 2002. Although it is new
and the regulation is less matured, the fast developing credit default swap mar-
ket has strongly aected the investor behavior and has led the information ow
relatively to the bond market25.
Based on the transaction data from January 2002 to July 2003, Cossin and Lu
[2005] nd that on average the dierences between the default premium im-
plied by the bond and the CDS premium are very small after stripping out the
liquidity layer and adjusting for the accrued interest. Bystrom [2006] looks at
the relationship between the iTraxx index and the stock prices by forming a
synthetic stock index made up of the names in the iTraxx index. He nds that
iTraxx CDS spreads tend to widen when stock price goes down and vice versa,
which underpins the existing relationship between the iTraxx index and stock
prices. As a stock can be deemed as the most subordinated debt of the underly-
ing, a very natural question arises: What is the relationship between the iTraxx
index and the underlying's outstanding debt?
The composite members of the iTraxx and iBoxx indices, and the form an in-
vestment takes, are dierent, so the conclusions drawn from the single-name
data are not directly applicable. Therefore two dierent trading strategies are
used to ease the comparison of the returns.
25The credit derivative market is less strictly regulated than the equity and bond markets.
In the US, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 excluded derivatives not traded
on any exchange from the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. And
while regulators from the Fed, SEC and FSA have addressed the importance of the regulating
of the credit derivative market, no eective regulation yet seems to have emerged.
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The structure of the paper is as following: Section 1 discusses the CDS and cash
bond markets, Section 2 introduces the cointegration model, Section 3 describes
the data set, Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis and Section
5 concludes.
4.2 The CDS and Bond Indices
4.2.1 Credit Default Swap
Credit default swaps (CDS) are used to transfer the credit risk of the underly-
ing entity from one party to another and are also the main building block for
other credit derivatives. When two counterparties enter a CDS contract, the
protection buyer pays the CDS premium (usually quarterly) to the protection
seller and the protection seller covers the loss of the face value when a credit
event occurs. In physical settlement, the protection buyer delivers the notional
amount of the deliverable obligations to the protection seller and receives the
notional amount paid in cash. Contrarily, the protection seller pays the protec-
tion buyer the par minus recovery rate of the underlying in cash settlement.
In the end of 2008, CDS market had increased to $38.6 trillion notional outstand-
ing from virtually nil in the 1990s. Figure 4.1 reports the notional outstanding
amounts of the CDS from surveys conducted by ISDA [2009].
By the nature of OTC products, the trading cost of CDS is also signicant.
The average relative CDS bid-ask spreads, dened as the bid-ask spread over
the mid CDS premium, was over 5% between 2001 and 200626. Hence, a more
liquid instrument would benet credit investors.
26The relative spreads are calculated using the CDS data from 2001 to 2006.
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Figure 4.1: The Amount of CDS Outstanding
The gure shows the amount of CDS outstanding using the ISDA survey data. The
x-axis shows the date point when the survey is conducted and the amount outstanding
is reported by the y-axis, in trillion U.S. Dollars.
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4.2.2 iTraxx CDS Index
iTraxx indices were launched by the International Index Company (IIC) on
July 21st, 2004. The iTraxx family covers dierent regions, currencies, yields,
volatilities and various industrial sectors. The benchmark indices are composed
of iTraxx Europe, iTraxx Europe HiVol and iTraxx Europe Crossover27.
All indices are updated every six months (March and September). The iTraxx
CDS Europe index (hereafter iTraxx index) includes top 125 names, equally
weighted, in terms of CDS volume traded in the six months prior to the poll.
Top 30 highest spread names from iTraxx Europe make up the iTraxx Europe
27See Appendix for the full structure of the iTraxx family.
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HiVol index while the iTraxx Europe Crossover index contains 45 European sub-
investment grade reference entities. The iTraxx family covers a wide variety of
the credit markets for dierent investors.
Table 4.1 describes the cash ow of a transaction involving an iTraxx index.
When there is no credit event until the maturity, the buyer of the protection
pays the CDS premia to the seller, usually the market maker, on a quarterly ba-
sis. Where a credit event occurs, the protection seller delivers the nominal face
value of the deliverable obligations tied to the reference entity, and receives the
defaulted obligation with the same face value. The amount of the nominal face
value, w  N , is determined by the weighting of the reference entity w and the
notional amount of the iTraxx contract N . After the credit event, the notional
amount is reduced by the nominal face value paid by the seller to (1 w) N and
the seller still receives the CDS premia until maturity subject to other possible
credit events.
Table 4.1: The Cash Flow of iTraxx Index
Panel A shows the cash ow of a contract of iTraxx index for protection buyers when there
is no default during the whole period. The CDS denotes the spread of iTraxx index, the
N denotes the notional amount, the UP denotes the upfront payment when the contract is
signed and T denotes the last period of the contract. Panel B presents the cash ow of a
contract of iTraxx index when one of the underlying entities defaults at time t. w denotes the
weighting of the defaulted underlying in the iTraxx index and DORE denotes the delivered
obligation of the reference entity.
Panel A: No Default
Date 0 1 2 ... ... ... ... T
Spread Payment - -CDSN -CDSN ... ... ... ... -CDSN
Other Payment UP - - ... ... ... ... -
Panel B: Default at Time t
Date 0 1 2 ... t t+1 ... T
Spread Payment - -CDSN -CDSN -CDSN -CDSN(1-w) ... -CDSN(1-w)
Other Payment UP - - - Nw - - -
Delivery -DORE
Since its inception, credit market investors have been actively trading iTraxx
and its related products. They now make it easier to take large trades on a
standard basket to speculate or hedge credit risk. It is also recognized that
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bid-ask spreads are tighter and liquidity for investors is improved. Unlike other
credit products, the iTraxx family has standardized maturity dates, which adds
the transparency and liquidity for all credit investors.
Hedge funds and trading desks, credit arbitrage desks and structured credit
desks within banks trade iTraxx indices intensively, including trading index
tranche and index options. However, real money investors, such as insurance
companies and pension funds, face legal and regulatory restrictions on trading
the iTraxx indices or products tied to them. In 2005, a survey report from
Merrill Lynch shows that over 90% of hedge funds use the indices whilst only
40% of real money investors use them.
Nowadays, many trading strategies are based on the iTraxx indices, which inte-
grates them well into the credit market. For example, credit investors use the
iTraxx indices to modify the credit duration of the portfolio with lower transac-
tion costs. Other popular trading strategies consist of convergence/dislocation
trades tied to iTraxx HiVol against iTraxx Europe, steepeners/atteners on the
5-year and 10-year part of the curve (curve trade), trading single names with
their sectors (relative-value trade) and the pure alpha strategy based on security
selection tied to the benchmark.
Products tied to the indices are also traded. The options on indices, especially
those on the iTraxx Crossover index, are more popular than those on single
names. As the trade of options on single names are based on the credit news
and thus often in one direction, it is less attractive for dealers to enter these
contracts.
4.2.3 iBoxx Bond Market Index
iBoxx indices, also published by International Index Company, are rule-based
indices. The bonds to form the indices are selected from bonds which are trad-
able and available to investors and asset managers. The iBoxx indices have a
hierarchical structure and are composed of sub-indices based on currency, type
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of issuer, maturity, credit rating and sector, and are used by investors as the
benchmark indices for the bond market. They are rebalanced either monthly
or quarterly, depending on index type, according to the selection criteria of
each index. The face value of the amount outstanding on each bond decides its
weighting.
We use the iBoxx EUR Corporates Overall index (hereafter called the iBoxx
index) in our research as it represents the important benchmark for the non-
sovereign bond market and is composed of the most liquid names. Hence, we
are able to detach the price of liquidity risk from the price of credit risk and
interest rate risk. The iBoxx index contains xed coupon, step-ups and event-
driven bonds. Callable dated and undated subordinated corporate debt and soft
bullets are also included. The selected bonds have minimum time to maturity
of one year, minimum rating of BBB- (S&P or Fitch) or Baa3 (Moody's)28,
minimum amount outstanding of 500 million euro.
The index is rebalanced monthly on the last business day. If an included bond
is leaving the broad iBoxx EUR Overall index29, the bond will be substituted.
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Motivation
As Blanco et al. [2005] have already shown that CDS premia tied to individ-
ual names and individual bond yields are highly correlated, and there is the
price discovery process, this paper investigates whether the returns from index
trading strategies are comparable. It is still unclear whether the relationship
between indices is similar because the names included in the indices are dier-
ent. Nevertheless, the returns are determined by the most liquid names, i.e.,
most traded names, in the markets. Since both markets are driven by the credit
risk, we expect certain relationship between the returns.
28The lowest rating applies when the ratings from the agencies dier.
29The iBoxx EUR Overall index is also rebalanced monthly.
4.3. MODEL 116
Since the liquidity and eciency of the iTraxx index and iBoxx index have made
them one of the most attractive tools in the market, clarifying relationships be-
tween the iTraxx index and iBoxx index should enhance credit investors' under-
standing of the market and improve their decision making. We rst test whether
the iTraxx, iBoxx and ve-year Euro swap rates are stationary processes. We
then use the cointegration test and VEC model to check both long-run steady
state and short-run dynamics among these series if they are non-stationary.
The construction of the iBoxx index means we cannot easily detach the price
of interest rate risk from that of the credit risk, which makes it hard to com-
pare it with the iTraxx index. Therefore, ve-year swap rate is included to
measure the impact of the variations in the interest rate. The price of liquid
risk is minimized in the analysis since only the most liquid instruments are used.
The research on the individual names motivates the error-correction type model:
iTraxx CDS Europe Index
ct = fc(X) + c(ecm)t 1 + c;t: (4.1)
iBoxx EUR Corporates Overall Index
bt = fb(X) + b(ecm)t 1 + b;t: (4.2)
Swap Rate
it = fi(X) + i(ecm)t 1 + i;t: (4.3)
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Here c and i are the level data of iTraxx index and swap rate, respectively. b is
the logarithm of iBoxx index. f(X) is a linear function of rst-dierence of X,
where X = [cbi], c, b and i are respective lagged rst-dierenced
c, b and i and the error-correction term (ecm)t 1 is a linear combination of ct 1,
bt 1 and it 1. The three  are the error terms. The error correction term is
to capture the short-run dynamics when the series are substantially away from
the steady state. No special functional form is assigned to the error correction
term at this stage.
The error correction system clearly species that if the underlying economic
relationship between iTraxx index, iBoxx index and swap rate holds, there are
both the long-run steady states and short-run dynamics. Credit investors should
take both the steady states and dynamics into account in their decision making
where the model is valid.
In the section on empirical results, we rst check the stationarity properties of
the time series and test the cointegration hypothesis. Then the error correction
system is estimated. We drop the other exogenous explanatory variables for
brevity.
4.3.2 Specication
The reduced form of the model is specied with Gaussian errors:
Yt = A1Yt 1 + :::+AkYt k + Et; t = 1; :::T; (4.4)
where Yt = [ct; bt; it], Y k+1; :::; Y0 are known variables, Y1; :::; Yt 1 are prede-
termined variables and Et are i.i.d. Gaussian errors. By dierencing, the error
correction form of the model is:
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Yt =  1Yt 1 + :::+  k 1Yt k+1 +Yt k + Et;
t = 1; :::T;
(4.5)
where  i =  (I   A1   :::   Ai) for i = 1; :::; k   1,  =  (I   A1   :::   Ak)
and  = 0, with factor loading  and cointegrating vector . If the series are
cointegrated, the cointegrating vector describes the underlying long-run equi-
librium relation among the iTraxx index, iBoxx index and swap rate.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Description
The daily data of the iTraxx index, iBoxx index and 5-year Euro interest swap
rates are used in the empirical analysis. All variables are in levels and the sam-
ple period is June 21st, 2004 to Jan 29th, 2007, which covers the downgrading
of GM and Ford's debt to non-investment grade. Figure 4.2 shows the time
series of the whole period in levels.
The iTraxx index series is updated every 6 months with the various coupon
rates, which is used to determine the upfront payment when the new index is
inaugurated. The iTraxx CDS Europe indices are numbered from 1 to 6, with 6
as the latest issuance. Table 4.2 shows the issuance date, coupon rate, maturity
date and the number of series.
The daily iTraxx index and iBoxx index are retrieved from the web site of
the International Index Company, and the ve-year Euro swap rates are those
provided by Bloomberg. We use the most recently issued iTraxx CDS Europe
indices, i.e. on-the-run index, to form the time series in our research30.
30The coupon rates of the iTraxx indices are dierent, and are related to the calculation of
upfront payment.
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Figure 4.2: The iTraxx, iBoxx Indices and the Swap Rate
The gures show the daily level data of iTraxx index, iBoxx index and swap rate.
The iTraxx index is in bps, the iBoxx is the price index and the swap rate is in %.
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Table 4.2: Properties of iTraxx CDS Europe Index
The table shows the properties of the iTraxx CDS Europe Index with descending
issuance date. The xed rate of iTraxx index are presented in percentage. The closing
date of each series is also reported.
Name Fixed Rate(%) Series Maturity Close
DJ iTraxx Europe 5Y 0.45 1 Sep 20th, 2009 Sep 17th, 2004
DJ iTraxx Europe 5Y 0.35 2 Mar 20th, 2010 Mar 18th, 2005
iTraxx Europe 5Y 0.35 3 Jun 20th, 2010 Sep 23rd, 2005
iTraxx Europe 5Y 0.35 4 Dec 20th, 2010 Mar 31st, 2006
iTraxx Europe 5Y 0.40 5 Jun 20th, 2011 Oct 3rd, 2006
iTraxx Europe 5Y 0.30 6 Dec 20th, 2011 Feb 15th, 2007
The dimension of the iTraxx index and the iBoxx index are also worthwhile
discussing. The iTraxx index is quoted in basis points, while the iBoxx index
is a price index that depends on the price of individual bonds included in the
index with respect to the price index level after rebalancing from the end of the
last month.
Since the iTraxx index is unfunded and the iBoxx is funded, a direct compar-
ison of these series cannot generate meaningful results. Hence, two portfolios
are formed. The trading strategy of Portfolio A is to buy the iTraxx index and
sell it at a later stage. The total investment is zero and the amount due to the
change of the iTraxx index is CiTraxx  DV 01  NiTraxx, where CiTraxx is
the change of the iTraxx CDS Europe spread, DV 01 is the Euro value of the
change of one basis point of CDS, and NiTraxx is the notional amount.
The trading strategy for Portfolio B is to replicate the iBoxx index by buying
the bonds in the market and selling them later. The amount invested is nanced
using the swap rate. All in all, the net investment is also zero. The return from
this portfolio is log
Pn
i=1 Pi;tNi;t sPn
i=1 Pi;t 1Ni;t s
, where Pi;t and Pi;t 1 are the price of bond
i at date t and t   1, respectively. Ni;t s is the notional amount of bond i at
date t  s. The payment of the swap rate is also added.
The iTraxx index data retrieved from IIC have both bid and ask prices. We
manually form the mid price by taking the average of these two series for a syn-
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thetic iTraxx index. The iBoxx EUR Corporates Overall indices are composed of
sub-indices with dierent time to maturity. The iBoxx EUR Corporates Overall
3-5 year and iBoxx EUR Corporates Overall 5-7 year indices are selected and
the average of these two indices are used to construct a synthetic iBoxx EUR
Corporates Overall 5 year index.
We elect to use the 5-year swap rate, collected from Bloomberg, rather than
the government bond rate to avoid the liquidity premium in the government
bonds31.
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the synthetic iTraxx index, synthetic
iBoxx index and the swap rate32. Altogether there are 688 observations from
June 2004 to January 2007. The iTraxx index and the swap rate are reported
in basis points and the iBoxx index is shown in relative ratio.
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the synthetic 5-year iTraxx index, the synthetic 5-year
iBoxx index and 5-year Euro swap rate are shown.
Mean Median Max Min Std Skewness Kurtosis Obs
Syn iTraxx Index (bp) 34.75 35.88 60.11 22.63 6.03 0.20 3.68 668
Syn iBoxx Index 140.92 142.00 145.48 131.00 3.45 -1.16 3.49 668
Euro Swap Rate (%) 3.41 3.34 4.26 2.62 0.44 0.02 1.78 668
The iTraxx index is composed of 125 single-name CDS, 25 names from the -
nancial sector and 100 names from the non-nancial sector. The names in the
latter can be further sorted as Autos (10 names), Consumers (30), Energy (20),
Industrials (20) and Telecommunications, Media and Technology (TMT) (20).
Compared with the iTraxx Europe Series 5, which was inaugurated 6 months
before the inauguration date of Series 6, eight names were substituted.
31Government bonds, such as the Bundesobligation, is deemed to be riskfree and are usually
among the most liquid nancial instruments in the market. Hence, the yield of the government
bond is usually lower than the "true" riskfree rate.
32We omit the "synthetic" prex in the coming sections for brevity.
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The iBoxx EUR Corporates Overall 3-5 year and 5-7 indices have 213 and 177
names, whereof 113 and 86 names are nancial, and 110 and 91 names are non-
nancial. The names in the non-nancial sector are Autos (12 and 8 names),
Consumers (16 and 16), Energy (22 and 23), Industrials (24 and 21) and TMT
(26 and 23)33, for 3-5 year and 5-7 year indices, respectively. The time to matu-
rity of the 3-5 year and 5-7 year indices are 4.01 and 6.04 years34, respectively.
Hence, it is reasonable to take the average of them to form the synthetic 5-year
index.
4.5 Results and Analysis
4.5.1 Unit Root Test and Order of Lagged Variables
It is essential to investigate whether the time series are integrated of order one
or not, to avoid spurious regression. Since we are interested in the cointegrating
relationships among the time series, any time series that is not I(1) does not
qualify. Therefore, we check the stationarity of both the level and the rst-
dierence of the iTraxx index, plus the logarithm of iBoxx index and the swap
rate, using both the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is based on the regression:
yt = yt 1 + xt
0
+ 1yt 1 + :::+ pyt p + vt; (4.6)
where  is 1- 35,  is the coecient vector to be estimated for the regressor xt,
which consists of the intercept and the trend,  is a vector of the coecients to
be estimated for the lagged variables yt s, s = 1; :::; p, p is the order of lagged
dierence which is determined by the Bayesian criteria and vt is the error term.
The Phillips-Perron test is based on the non-augmented Dickey-Fuller test with
33The sectors used in iBoxx EUR Corporate index are dierent from those in iTraxx CDS
Europe index. Hence, we merge some of the sectors in the iBoxx EUR Corporate index to
make the results comparable with those of the iTraxx CDS Europe index.
34The time to maturity is calculated on Jan 31st, 2007. Since the bonds are rebalanced
monthly, the time to maturity of indices also varies.
35For the time series yt = yt 1 + xt0 + t, yt is stationary if jj < 1.
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Table 4.4: Unit Root Tests
The table presents the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test. The
null hypothesis is the time series has unit root. The rst-dierence of the time series
is also checked for possible high-order integration. We include both time trend and
intercept in these two tests.
Panel A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
iTraxx log(iBoxx) Swap iTraxx  log(iBoxx) Swap
test-stat -3.31 -2.38 -2.00 -10.15 -25.43 -25.31
p-value 0.06 0.39 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Phillips-Perron Test
iTraxx log(iBoxx) Swap iTraxx log(iBoxx) Swap
test-stat -2.99 -2.38 -2.00 -17.34 -25.44 -25.30
p-value 0.14 0.39 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
adjusted statistic:
t^ = t(
0
f0
)
1
2   T (f0   0)(se(^))
2f
1=2
0 s
(4.7)
where t^ is the t-stat of the estimated , se(^) is the coecient standard error
and s is the standard error of the test regression. 0 and f0 are the consistent
estimator of the error variance of non-augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the es-
timator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero, respectively.
Table 4.4 reports the results of the unit root test. In Panel A, the null hypoth-
esis that there is a unit root in the level of the iTraxx index, the logarithm
of iBoxx index and the swap rate cannot be rejected at the 5% critical level.
After rst-dierencing, the t-statistics are -10.15, -25.43 and -25.31, showing
that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Panel B presents the output with the
Phillips-Perron test, which have similar results. The test statistic of iTraxx in-
dex is -17.34, which rejects the null hypothesis of I(1) process at the 1% level;
the test statistic of the logarithm of iBoxx index and the swap rate are -25.39
and -25.44, respectively, which also rejects the unit root hypothesis at the 1%
statistical level. The series are thus I(1) series, based on the unit root test.
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Before we step into the error-correction model, we will specify the order of lagged
variables k in Equation 4.4 using the Bayesian criteria. The model is specied
as following:
Yt =  1Yt 1 +Yt 2 + Et;
t = 1; :::T;
(4.8)
where the  1 and  are dened as  (I  A1) and  (I  A1  A2), respectively.
The Y vector consists of the iTraxx index, the logarithm of iBoxx index and the
swap rate. Et is a vector of i.i.d. error terms
36.
4.5.2 Cointegration Test
Cointegration Test
Table 4.5 presents the Johansen cointegration test results. Panel A reports
the trace test with intercept and trend in the cointegrating equation and lin-
ear deterministic trend in the level data. The trace test shows that the null
hypothesis that there is no cointegrating equation, against the alternative hy-
pothesis that there are 2 cointegrating equations, is rejected with trace statistic
of 66.76. The null hypothesis that there is 1 cointegrating equation, which is
against the same alternative hypothesis that there are 2 cointegrating equations,
cannot be rejected with trace statistic of 17.23, given the 5% critical value is
25.32. Therefore, there is 1 cointegrating equation that drives the short-term
dynamics among the three time series.
Panel B gives the results using the maximum eigenvalue test with intercept
36We use the level data of CDS in our analysis rather than the logarithm of the data. By
denition, the return of the iTraxx CDS can be calculated using the product of the change of
the spread level and the DV 01 discounting factor. Investors could easily calculate the return
themselves whilst the movement of the markets is predicted. The logarithm of the level data
also contains unit root for each of them and the properties of the estimated VEC model do
not vary much.
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Table 4.5: Cointegration Test
The Johansen cointegration test is applied to estimate the cointegrating rank. We
include the time trend and intercept in the test procedure to capture the time-varying
phenomenon in the markets. Panel A reports the trace test results while the results
using maximum eigenvalue are shown in Panel B.
Panel A: Trace Test
Hypothesized Trace 5 % 1 %
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value
None 0.072 60.94 34.55 40.49
At most 1 0.016 12.61 18.17 23.46
At most 2 0.004 2.51 3.74 6.40
Panel B: Maximum Eigenvalue Test
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 % 1 %
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value
None 0.072 48.33 23.78 28.83
At most 1 0.016 10.09 16.87 21.47
At most 2 0.004 2.51 3.74 6.40
and trend in cointegrating equation, and linear deterministic trend in the level
data. The maximum eigenvalue statistic of 49.52 rejects the null hypothesis of
no cointegrating equation against the alternative hypothesis of 1 cointegrating
equation. Moreover, the null hypothesis of 1 cointegrating equation against the
alternative hypothesis of 2 cointegrating equations cannot be rejected with a
maximum eigenvalue statistic of 13.11. Hence, both the trace test and the max-
imum eigenvalue test identify 1 cointegrating equation among these three series.
VECM Parameters
The coecients of the vector error correction model are estimated after the coin-
tegrating rank is identied. The VEC model takes the cointegrating equation
into account and restricts the long-run relationship among the series to con-
verge to their cointegrating relationship, while allowing the short-run dynamics
to adjust the deviation from the long-run relationship. If one of the time series
moves substantially away from the long-run relationship, the short-run dynam-
ics of these time series will pull it back on track. Hence, both the long-run
relation and the short-run dynamics govern the movement of the whole system
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and are important in the decision-making process.
Table 4.6 presents the estimated coecients, standard error and p-value of
the VEC model. First, the coecients of the cointegrating equation are re-
ported. As there is 1 cointegrating equation, the  vector, which contains
the swap rate, the iTraxx index, the logarithm of the iBoxx index, the time
trend and a constant, where the coecient of swap rate is normalized to 137,
is (1; 0:01; 22:92; 0:00; 116:20)0. The t-statistics show that all of them are
statistically signicant.
The estimated coecients of the lagged variables and the cointegrating equation
are reported in the lower part of the table. The test statistics of the cointegrat-
ing equation are signicant for the iTraxx index and the logarithm of the iBoxx
index at the 5% condence level. Contrarily, the coecient of the swap rate is
not signicant at the 5% level. The change of the iTraxx and the logarithm of
the iBoxx indices are strongly aected by the cointegrating equation, while the
change of the swap rate is not inuenced. The short-run dynamics of the iTraxx
and the logarithm of the iBoxx indices, driven by the cointegrating equation,
pull the iTraxx and the logarithm of the iBoxx series back to the long-run steady
state when they have deviated from the long-run relationship.
The coecients of the lagged variables have dierent statistical signicance.
None of the lagged variables have an impact on the change of the swap rate,
including the autoregressive element of the swap rate38. The swap rate is thus
hardly inuenced by the change in the iTraxx and iBoxx indices. It conrms
that the swap rate only has the interest rate risk, which is not associated with
the credit risk from the credit derivatives market via the iTraxx index.
37The  vector is unrestricted and there are numerous possible values. However, these values
are not linear independent. Hence, we normalize one element and obtain a representative
vector that can be used to form other possible values for the cointegrating equation.
38We also perform the correlogram test for the rst-dierence of swap rate to exclude the
impact of the cointegrating equation. The results stay the same.
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Table 4.6: Estimation of Vector Error Correction Model
The table reports the estimation of the vector error correction model which is based
on the cointegration test in the previous subsection. The Johansen method is used
for the system containing the iTraxx index, the iBoxx index and swap rate. Panel
A shows the estimation of the factor loading and cointegrating vector, whilst the
coecients on the cointegrating relation and other lagged variables are shown in
Panel B. The standard deviation is presented under the coecient, which is then
followed by the t-statistic in bracket.
Panel A: Coecients of Cointegrating Equation Variables
Swap(-1) iTraxx(-1) log(iBoxx)(-1) Trend C
1 0.01 22.92 0.00 -116.20
0.0009 0.2620 0.0000
[ 15.2646] [ 87.4973] [-78.3939]
Panel B: Coecients of Lagged Endogenous Variables
Error Correction: Swap iTraxx log(iBoxx)
CointEq 0.07 -5.26 -0.01
0.05 1.04 0.00
[ 1.39] [-5.04] [-2.80]
Swap(-1) -0.08 -0.41 -0.01
0.10 2.12 0.00
[-0.78] [-0.19] [-2.88]
iTraxx(-1) 0.00 0.37 0.00
0.00 0.04 0.00
[-1.38] [ 9.65] [-0.31]
log iBoxx(-1) -2.36 -23.34 -0.24
2.29 49.38 0.09
[-1.03] [-0.47] [-2.52]
C 0.00 -0.02 0.00
0.00 0.03 0.00
[ 0.52] [-0.59] [ 3.36]
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The coecients of the lagged variables on the change of iTraxx index are not sig-
nicant except for the autoregressive element. The lagged change in the iTraxx
index has a positive impact on the change in the iTraxx index, which shows
that there is autocorrelation in the credit derivatives market. The change in the
iTraxx index is driven by the short-run dynamics via the cointegrating equation
and the autoregressive elements.
When we check the coecients of lagged variables on the change in the log-
arithm of the iBoxx index, we nd negative and signicant coecients from
the lagged change of swap rate and the autoregressive change of the logarithm
of the iBoxx index and the insignicant coecient from the lagged change in
the iTraxx index. The credit risk and interest rate risk in the logarithm of the
iBoxx index are partly explained by the change in the lagged swap rate and itself.
Hence, we can infer that the cointegrating equation drives the whole system,
whilst the change of lagged variable also inuence the equations of the iTraxx
and the logarithm of the iBoxx indices.
GM and Ford downgraded to junk grade
Figure 4.3 shows the cointegrating relation generated with the estimated co-
ecients of the VEC model above. The line shows the numerical value of the
cointegrating relation from June 21, 2004 to January 29, 2007. According to the
VEC model estimation, all coecients of the three series in the cointegrating
relation are positive. I.e., an increase in any of the three series will raise the
numerical value of the tted cointegrating relation. The level of the cointegrat-
ing relation usually increases if markets are in turmoil and decreases when the
stability returns. From the gure, we clearly nd the peak around May, 2005,
when S&P downgraded GM and Ford to non-investment grade.
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Figure 4.3: Cointegrating Equation
The gure shows the tted value of cointegrating equation using the estimated
cointegrating vector. The x-axis shows the daily date reported and y-axis presents
the numerical value of the cointegrating equation.
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We give the story briey here. After months of close observation of GM and
Ford's outstanding debt, on May 5th, 2005, bond market investors found that
S&P had downgraded GM and Ford to non-investment grade. The rating an-
nouncement came just one day after the reported news that the former Chrysler
investor Kirk Kerkorian was oering $31 a share, about 13% above where the
share closed the previous trading day, for up to 28 million GM shares through
Tracinda Group39.
In the credit derivative market, correlation trading, or "Equity vs Mezz" strate-
gies, were widely used by hedge funds to sell protection on equity tranches and
buy protection on mezzanine tranches. The correlation trading of single tranche
synthetic CDOs are based on the one-factor Gaussian copula model, which was
criticized after the shakeout because it malfunctioned. From May 5th onwards,
investors needed to purchase protection against these two reference entities,
which drove the CDS indices level dramatically. On May 17th, the CDS indices
reached their peak and then began to drop, and had nearly recovered on May
26th. Some of the hedge funds fared badly in this market, according to the
Merrill Lynch Report, the monthly return on correlation trading was as bad as
-12%. The eect of the dealers' rush to hedge the unhedged bespoke mezzanine
risks dominated that of the unwinding of long correlation trades by the hedge
funds, which led to the widening of equity tranche spreads and the tightening
of mezzanine tranche spreads.
39Tracinda has already owned 22 million GM shares before that day, or less than 4% of all
the shares. Tracinda's statement said that the move was for investment purpose only. Neither
GM nor Tracinda made any comment on the statement.
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Figure 4.4: The Market Turmoil in May 2005
The gure shows the tted value of cointegrating equation using the estimated
cointegrating vector. The x-axis shows the daily date reported and y-axis presents
the numerical value of the cointegrating equation.
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Figure 4.4 presents the level of series during May 2005. The variation in the
iTraxx index is much higher than that in the swap rate and the iBoxx index.
Moreover, the movement of the iTraxx index was the reverse of the swap rate and
the iBoxx index. The iTraxx index had increased nearly 50% to its peak, while
the swap rate and the iBoxx index had not changed substantially. The short-
run dynamics had driven the credit derivative market, which deviated from the
long-run steady state when the exogenous downgrading shock was present, back
on track. In the CDS equation, the negative coecient of the cointegrating rela-
tion led to a decreasing iTraxx index. The higher the iTraxx level, the stronger
the impact of the cointegrating relation. When the iTraxx index was increasing
dramatically due to the immense demand for credit protection, the level of the
cointegrating relation also increased, to around three times the level before the
crisis, to pull the deviating series back to the long-run steady state. The iTraxx
index reached its peak on May 17th and had gone back to the normal level by
the end of that month.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper uses the multiple time series technique to check the relationship be-
tween credit derivative and bond markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the rst paper to examine this relationship at market level.
We nd that there is a cointegration relation among credit derivative market,
bond market and swap rate. In the VEC model, credit derivative market is
by far most aected by the cointegrating relation. We conrm that there are
both long-term steady-state relationships and short-term dynamics in credit
derivative market, cash bond market and interest rate. If one of the series goes
substantially away from the long-term steady-state, the cointegration relation
will pull it back to the steady-state. We believe the nding is important for the
management of credit market investors' portfolios, and it also helps regulators
to use the market information eciently to avoid the possible crisis.
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Further analysis could be developed to examine the market behavior before
and after the GM crisis in May 2005. Since trading strategies were very much
changed after the crisis, the relationship could also be dierent. Moreover, this
paper uses only European market data in the multiple time series analysis, and
North American markets were more aected by the crisis, making more in-depth
research worth while.
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Appendix
This table shows the structure of the whole iBoxx index family. The iBoxx Euro
Overall is composed of the Sovereign Index and the non-sovereign index. In the
sovereign index, the indices of 11 European nations are available and form the
Sovereign Index. The Non-sovereign Index consists of Sub-sovereigns, Collat-
eralized and Corporates indices, where there are further sub-indices in each of
them. The indices are either real-time or daily data (End-of-Day), which de-
pends on the desire of the market participants.
iBoxx Euro Overall
Sovereign Non-Sovereigns
Sub-sovereigns Collateralized Corporates
Germany Agencies Covered Financials
Austria Other Sovereigns -Germany Non-Financials
Belgium Other Subsovereigns -Ireland Market Sectors
Finland Public Banks -France Senior Subordinated
France Regions -Spain
Greece Supranational -UK
Ireland Other Securitized
Italy Other Collateralized
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
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